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Preface
The fundamental idea underlying this thesis is the importance of elections as an in-
centive device for solving political agency problems between the government and its
citizens. Beginning with Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) political agency models
demonstrate the importance of elections as an incentive device for disciplining the self-
interest of politicians and emphasize the role of political competition regarding that
matter. But, while it is widely accepted that competition is salient for the efficient
functioning of markets for goods and services, the precise role of competition in pol-
itics is less evident. Numerous authors like Becker (1983, 1985) and Wittman (1989)
have argued that political competition enhances the efficiency of democracies. More-
over, there is some empirical evidence indicating that political competition is indeed
important for mitigating agency problems that are prevalent in politics.1 However, the
literature also discusses the possibility that the incentives politicians face when striving
for reelection distort policy choices. Political budget cycle models following Nordhaus
(1975), for example, argue that politics becomes short-sighted whenever elections are
pending. Lizzeri and Persico (2005), for instance, argue that more competition forces
parties to focus on the interests of a narrower constituency thereby strengthening the
influence of special interests.
The aim of the thesis is to provide some more pieces of evidence which help to clarify
the functioning of elections as an incentive mechanism. We are going to study how the
short-term incentives provided by elections can be mitigated, which role the informed-
ness of voters plays for holding the government accountable, whether restrictions to
the entry of potential political candidates are effective and whether established parties
exploit their power to restrict electoral competition.2 Throughout this thesis, we build
- as regards content and methodologically - on the innovations brought forward by
1See e.g. Besley, Persson, and Sturm (2006).
2The terms ‘political competition’ and ‘electoral competition’ are in principle interchangeable.
Nevertheless, we mainly use the latter term in Chapter 3 and 4 in order to indicate that we only refer
to competition by other candidates in elections.
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political economics in contrast to the Pigouvian paradigm. The latter refers to the no-
tion of a social planner when determining policy questions3 and consequently neglects
both the implementation of these policies and the design of institutional constraints for
policy-makers. The crucial idea underlying of political economics is to study precisely
these questions by focussing on the political decision-making process itself.4 In doing
so, political economics applies the rigorous framework of rational choice and formal mi-
croeconomic foundations when analyzing politics. At the same time, the application of
modern econometric methods in order to test the hypotheses generated by theoretical
models empirically has become indispensable.
When dealing with political agency problems between the government and its citizens,
and in particular the incentives provided by elections, political agency models are a
natural stating point.5 Chapter 1 and 2 both contain a probabilistic voting version of
these models as introduced by Persson and Tabellini (2000). These offer an explicit
microeconomic foundation of the constraints faced by the incumbent politician. Due to
the random elements in the voting decision of the citizens, the outcome of the election
is difficult for policy-makers to predict. Thus, the resulting probability of winning
becomes a smooth function of policy variables which allows to analyze how changes
in the institutional setting alter the incentives of policy-makers. In both chapters,
we start from a situation where the electoral incentives are inherently distorted. The
two models differ in so far as Chapter 1 studies how the government’s self-interest is
constrained by the interaction with a further non-elected institution, whereas Chapter
2 analyzes how changes in the composition of the electorate affect the accountability
of the government.
Despite the similarities regarding the underlying model, the first two chapters are
based on an entirely different motivation. Chapter 1 is meant to critically scrutinize
the concept of socially harmful bureaucrats as suggested by Public Choice scholars.
Accordingly, this chapter is closest to this classical literature. For example, it entails
an explicit normative analysis of the welfare effects of bureaucrats. Moreover, the
specification of the bureaucracy’s preferences is directly related to Niskanen (1971).
The aim of Chapter 1 is to show that the conclusions of the classical Public Choice
literature regarding bureaucracies are overly lopsided since the welfare effects of these
institutions are not analyzed in the broader context of public decision-making, i.e. in
the context of the interaction between different political agents. In contrast, Chapter 2
3See Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980).
4For a introduction to the wider historical context of the field political economics see Besley (2007)
5For a recent survey see Besley (2006).
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does not target on defining an optimal institutional setting, but rather tries to formally
analyze the relationship between foreign emergency aid and the political accountability
of governments in recipient countries. Its main goal is to specify the conditions under
which foreign aid impairs the incumbent government’s constraints. At the same time,
the model is intended to generate testable implication which we start to analyze in
Chapter 2 as well.
The importance of exposing theoretical hypotheses to the data manifests itself in Chap-
ter 2, and even more in Chapter 3 and 4. The empirical part of Chapter 2 and Chap-
ter 3 have in common that they both aim at an exact identification of effects which
have already been discussed in the literature but without taking possible endogeneity
problems seriously. For that purpose Chapter 2 employs the instrumental variables
approach and discusses two different potential instruments for foreign aid in order to
determine its impact on the accountability of governments in recipient countries. In
contrast, Chapter 3 builds on the difference-in-difference approach and exploits a deci-
sion by the US Supreme Court as a natural experiment in order to identify the impact
of ballot access restrictions on electoral competition. Chapter 4, however, intends to
offer new empirical evidence on the endogeneity of political institutions by exploiting
the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 as an instrument for electoral competition.
Chapter 3 and 4 both focus on the necessary preconditions for the functioning of
political constraints by studying restrictions to political markets. This shifts the focus
of our thesis to immediate determinants of political competition, namely laws governing
the access of potential candidates to elections. Chapter 3 deals with the impact of
such restriction on the candidates’ decision-making behavior. Its main purpose is to
convincingly show that ballot access laws are highly effective in reducing electoral
competition. In doing so, this chapter fits neatly into the related literature since it
analyzes the impact of ballot access restrictions as exogenous constraints on policy-
makers. This is entirely different with respect to Chapter 4 where we test the idea that
established parties design political institutions for their own purposes. This idea itself
is very recent and besides Trebbi, Aghion, and Alesina (2007) there is little evidence
regarding this issue. The study presented in Chapter 4 is the first one which finds
evidence of the design of ballot access rules.
Before going into detail, we briefly outline the central ideas and major contributions
of this thesis chapter by chapter.
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Chapter 1: Political Agency and the Beneficial Effects of Bureaucrats
Chapter 1 is based on the idea that bureaucracies, which are widely regarded as a cause
of inefficiently large government expenditures by economists, might be (up to certain
limits) mitigate short-term politics. To study this issue, we introduce a probabilistic
voting model which will also be employed in a modified version in Chapter 2. In the
version of Chapter 1, the society consists of three groups of voters belonging to different
generations. Since the young generation is excluded from taking part in elections, the
political process results in an allocation of public expenditures that is distorted towards
public consumption expenditures. As the old generation is already deceased in the
second period, its members have no interest in the provision of public investment goods.
The young generation of voters with an immediate interest in public investments is,
however, excluded from voting like it is generally stipulated in the existing voting laws.
This in turn gives the incumbent politician an incentive to shift public expenditures
towards present consumption in order to be reelected. We show that in this situation,
voters benefit from the presence of an independent bureaucracy for two reasons. Firstly,
as bureaucrats increase public expenditures excessively, they also raise the level of
public investment which is beneficial if the level of public investments is too low in the
first place. Secondly, the additional expenditures induced by the bureaucracy increase
the excess burden of taxation thereby reducing the leeway of politicians to capture
rents for themselves.
Most importantly our paper contributes to the discussion of the role of bureaucrats
in economics. In contrast to sociologists like Weber (1922/2001) who emphasized
the importance of bureaucracies for the functioning of the modern state, economists
have mainly pointed out the potential drawbacks of bureaucracies. Both Niskanen’s
(1971) analysis and the modified version by Migue´ and Be´langer (1974) conclude that
bureaucracies become too large according to the government’s preferences and evaluate
these expenditure increases as detrimental. We, however, find that the influence of
bureaucracies can be welfare increasing if pre-existing political distortions are present
and the excess burden of taxation is taken into account. Moreover, our analyis provides
a theoretical underpinning of the empirical literature on the impact of bureaucracies.
Rauch (1995) shows that the establishment of professional bureaucracies instead of
politically appointed bureaucracies was crucial for growth when analyzing municipal
reforms in US cities at the beginning of the 20th century. He argues that professional
bureaucracies increase the time horizon of public decision makers.
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The main insight from this chapter is that the welfare effects of institutions like bu-
reaucracies need to be considered in the broader context of public decision-making,
i.e. in the context of the interaction between different political agents. Furthermore,
our model offers a way to reconcile Rauch’s empirical findings with Niskanen’s view
of budget-expanding bureaucrats. A small and limited level of bureaucratic influence
generates Rauch’s results, whereas an excessive influence confirms Niskanen’s hypoth-
esis.
Chapter 2: Political Accountability and Development Aid
Chapter 2 investigates the conditions under which foreign emergency aid undermines
political accountability in development countries. For that purpose, we set up a simple
retrospective voting model similar to that employed in Chapter 1 which we adapt to the
characteristics of aid-dependent countries. In our model, an incumbent politician in the
recipient country decides on investments in disaster prevention and relief infrastructure
which both influence the probability of natural disasters and the extent of damage.
Crucially for our results, a part of the electorate is uninformed about the actions
taken by the incumbent politician and bases its voting decision on its actual economic
situation. These voters only learn something about the incumbent politician’s effort if
a disaster actually occurs. By providing emergency aid, international donors insure the
incumbent politician at least partly against the political risk that ill-informed voters
who are affected by a disaster detect the government’s negligence. Therefore, our
main result is that foreign emergency aid weakens the incentives provided by electoral
constraints. Among other things, we also find that the incumbent’s performance shrinks
when the fraction of ill-informed voters rises. Moreover, we test the main implication of
our model and discuss the possibility to employ the voting pattern in the UN General
Assembly as an alternative instrument for foreign aid.
Chapter 2 contributes to the limited literature on the linkage between foreign aid and
political accountability. Cohen and Werker (2007) also scrutinize the impact of foreign
aid on disaster prevention by a national government, but do not provide an explicit
model of the political process. In their model the government maximizes a social wel-
fare function. Moreover, this chapter relates to Besley and Burgess (2002) who also
argue that having a more informed electorate strengthens incentives for governments
to be responsive. However, they focus on the importance of the media in providing
information and do not offer an explicit analysis of the voting behavior of differently in-
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formed citizens. Knack (2001) tests whether aid dependency can potentially undermine
the quality of governance by weakening accountability and encouraging rent-seeking.
He finds that aid significantly reduces a country’s quality of governance, but does not
discuss the potential endogeneity of the instruments employed in his analysis.
The main contribution of Chapter 2 is to analyze the impact of foreign aid on political
accountability explicitly in a voting model and to formalize the argument that inter-
national donors ensure a recipient country’s government against the consequences of
insufficient disaster prevention. Moreover, we extend the empirical analysis by Knack
(2001) by assessing the quality of different potential instrumental variables.
Chapter 3: Ballot Access Restrictions and Electoral Competition
This chapter studies whether restrictions to political markets actually deter poten-
tial candidates. To provide an adequate answer, we analyze a particular institution,
namely ballot access laws, which govern the access of third party6 and independent
candidates to election. These restriction require potential candidates to file a petition
signed by a certain number of eligible voters. Since the major parties are likely to
use their predominant position in order to obstruct political competitors as suggested
by Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi (2004) as well as Trebbi, Aghion, and Alesina (2007),
we expect stringent regulations in states with stiff electoral competition and liberal
regulations in those with little competition. This in turn renders naive estimates of the
impact of ballot access restrictions on electoral competition uninformative. To over-
come this endogeneity problem, we exploit the decision of the US Supreme Court in
Williams v. Rhodes, which declared Ohio’s ballot access requirements unconstitutional
in 1968, as a natural experiment. This allows us to identify the effectiveness of bal-
lot access requirements in reducing the degree of electoral competition in US House
elections as measured by the number of minor party and independent candidates. The
results based on a series of difference-in-difference estimations indicate that ballot ac-
cess requirements as used in most US states have a strong deterrent effect on these
candidates.
Chapter 3 confirms the previous studies like Ansolabehere and Gerber (1996) and
Stratmann (2005) which also analyze the effectiveness of ballot access laws in deterring
minor party candidates, but do not address the problem that ballot access restrictions
6The terms ‘third party’ and ‘minor party’ are interchangeable.
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might be adapted to differing levels of electoral competition. Instead these studies
rely on the assumption that ballot access laws are exogenously given which is highly
critical as explicitly shown in Chapter 4. Chapter 3 also adds to the literature on
third parties and independent candidates in the United States. Duverger (1964) points
out that the majoritarian voting system promotes the existence of two dominating
political parties. Similarly, Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) emphasizes the interaction
between the electoral system and the heterogeneity of the society as a determinant of
the number of parties. Yet, the effectiveness of ballot access laws and the wide-spread
use of these regulations strongly indicate that institution beyond the electoral system
need to be taken into account when explaining the number of parties.
The main contribution of Chapter 3 is the provision of a precisely identified estimate
of the effect of ballot access restriction on the degree of electoral competition while
explicitly addressing the endogeneity of the relevant state laws. In doing so, this chapter
also builds the basis for a detailed analysis of the design of political institutions as it
follows in the next chapter.
Chapter 4: The Design of Political Institutions
Chapter 4 starts from the fact that entry restrictions to political markets actually de-
ter potential candidates as shown in Chapter 3. Since established parties both have
the possibility and an immediate incentive to design the corresponding laws, we ask
whether there is any evidence of the intentional design of political institutions which
fosters the interests of established parties. Like in the previous chapter, we focus on
the design of laws governing ballot access of third parties and independent candidates
in US states. Using state-level variation in the definition of these rules between 1946
and 1976, we ask how the degree of competition in gubernatorial elections faced by the
major parties affects the design of ballot access requirements. As in Chapter 3, it is
crucial to account for the endogeneity of observed levels of electoral competition since
this measure already reflects the deterrent effect of existing ballot access requirements
on potential third party and independent candidates. Thus, we exploit the federal
Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965 as a source of exogenous state-level variation in
electoral competition. First, we substantiate the widespread notion that the Voting
Rights Act dramatically altered the political landscape of the US South by a series of
difference-in-difference estimations. These estimates indicate that the federal interven-
tion to abolish limitations to black voter participation, such as poll taxes and literacy
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tests, significantly raised the number of candidates in gubernatorial elections. This
finding is shown to be robust to a number of changes in our specification. Second, we
solve the endogeneity problem of our main regression by constructing an instrumental
variable from the federal intervention itself, thereby exploiting the exogenous variation
in electoral competition induced by the Voting Rights Act. We find across various
specifications that state policymakers systematically tighten state ballot access laws in
reaction to increased electoral competition by new political parties and independent
candidates.
Chapter 4 refers to a small number of contributions which discusses the strategic choice
of electoral rules like Alesina and Glaeser (2004), Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) and
Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi (2004). Moreover, there is a direct link to Trebbi, Aghion,
and Alesina (2007) who report empirical evidence that the choice of electoral rules in
US cities varies with the share of minorities in a way that effectively limits minority
representation.
The main contribution of Chapter 4 consists in the identification of the extent to which
established parties use the legislature in order to reduce electoral competition thereby
providing detailed evidence on the endogenous nature of political institutions.
Chapter 1
Bureaucracies and short-term
politics
1.1 Introduction
Beginning with Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) political agency models demonstrate
the importance of elections as an incentive device for disciplining the self-interest of
politicians.1 The beneficial effects of elections are also supported by an increasing
number of empirical studies.2 However, there are important contributions to the liter-
ature which highlight potential distortions resulting from the incentives politicians face
when striving for reelection. An example are political budget cycle models following
Nordhaus (1975) which argue that politics becomes short-sighted whenever elections
are pending. Recent evidence provided by Alt and Lassen (2006) suggests that such
distortions are a widespread phenomenon even in advanced democracies and depend on
the country’s fiscal transparency. Equally, Shi and Svensson (2006) emphasize that po-
litical budget cycles are a common feature of most democracies, but differ substantially
across countries. Against this background, the question arises which institutional con-
ditions might compensate the negative side-effects of elections and alleviate short-term
politics.
In the following, we argue that bureaucracies, which are widely regarded as a cause of
inefficiently large government expenditures by economists, might (up to certain limits)
1For a recent survey see Besley (2006).
2For example, Besley, Persson, and Sturm (2006) find evidence that political competition reduces
the influence of special interest groups thereby fostering growth.
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mitigate short-term politics. To study this issue, we propose a simple probabilistic
voting model where the society consists of three groups of voters belonging to different
generations. Since the young generation is excluded from taking part in elections, the
political process results in an allocation of public expenditures that is distorted towards
consumption expenditures. We show that in this situation, voters benefit from the pres-
ence of an independent bureaucracy for two reasons. Firstly, as bureaucrats increase
public expenditures excessively, they also raise the level of public investment which
is beneficial if the level of public investments is too low in the first place. Secondly,
the additional expenditures induced by the bureaucracy increase the excess burden of
taxation thereby reducing the leeway of politicians to capture rents for themselves.
To begin with, we model a situation where the incentives of elections are inherently
distorted. For that purpose, we set up a probabilistic voting model with two periods
where voters belong to three different generations.3 Therein, we assess the level of pub-
lic investments which are provided by the government in the first period, but only yield
returns in the second period. Since the members of the old generation are no longer
present in the second period, they have no interest in the provision of public investment
goods. The young generation of voters with an immediate interest in public invest-
ments, however, is excluded from voting like it is generally stipulated by the existing
voting laws. This in turn gives the incumbent politician an incentive to shift public
expenditures towards present consumption in order to be reelected. Consequently, the
allocation of public goods provided by office-seeking politicians is distorted when seen
from the perspective of a social planner. Naturally, this “short-term”distortion to-
wards present consumption prevails even if political competition becomes increasingly
stiff and politicians can no more appropriate any rents for themselves. In contrast,
the “imperfect agency” distortion, i.e. the rents appropriated by the incumbent politi-
cian, disappears completely if political competition increases sufficiently. The crucial
point is that political competition is no remedy for a distortion which is inherent to
the incentive structure of elections. In our case, it is immediately evident that politi-
cians neglect the interest of those who do not posses the right to vote if the incentive
mechanism disciplining their actions is based on votes.
After showing that the exclusion of the young generation from the election results in
distorted policy choices, we analyze how the institutional setting shapes the extent
of short-term politics. In doing so, we focus on non-elected political institutions and
bureaucracies in particular. More precisely, we think of top bureaucrats in ministries
3Regarding the probabilistic voting framework see Lindbeck and Weibull (1987).
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and at other government agencies who have a considerable influence on political deci-
sions due the special knowledge of ’their’ policy area. Building on Kessing and Konrad
(2008), we argue that bureaucrats have a bias for high government expenditures which
is not curbed by electoral constraints as bureaucrats are often appointed for a long
time. Consequently, bureaucrats are less sensitive to the citizens’ preferences as cor-
rectly criticized by Public Choice scholars.4 In our setting, however, this deviation
from the will of the electorate is not welfare-decreasing in general, but may entail
a welfare-improving flip-side: If bureaucrats increase public expenditures excessively,
they also raise the level of public investment which is beneficial if political competition
induces politicians to provide too little public investments in the first place. A priori it
is not clear whether this beneficial effect dominates the detrimental overall expenditure
increase caused by bureaucrats. However, it can be shown that starting from a situa-
tion where politicians have full control, a small increase of the bureaucrats’ influence
increases voters’ utility. This result is based on a typical second best argument: The
increase of public consumption is a second order loss, whereas the increase of public
investment is a first order gain. Moreover, we find that the presence of a bureaucracy
reduces the leeway of politicians to capture rents for themselves. This argument builds
on the idea that the marginal excess burden of taxation increases with the level of
taxation. Therefore, voters are more sensitive with respect to additional expenditures
if a bureaucracy is present and accordingly the tax rate is higher.
Since we start by modeling distortions of the political process, our paper is related
to the literature on political business cycles following Nordhaus (1975). These models
generally argue that informational asymmetries are the causes for policy distortions.
Rogoff (1990), for example, proposes an adverse selection model where the more tal-
ented politician distorts the budget. Shi and Svensson (2006) propose a moral hazard
model of electoral competition and also provide evidence that elections affect the com-
position of public expenditures. Moreover, they find that political budget cycles are
significantly larger in developing countries than in developed countries. Alt and Lassen
(2006) show that political budget cycles also exist in countries with low fiscal trans-
parency including many advanced democracies.
Most importantly our paper contributes to the discussion of the role of bureaucrats
in economics. In contrast to sociologists like Weber (1922/2001) who emphasized
the importance of bureaucracies for the functioning of the modern state, economists
have mainly pointed out the potential drawbacks of bureaucracies. Both Niskanen’s
4For a summary of the empirical evidence see Mueller (2003).
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(1971) analysis and the modified version by Migue´ and Be´langer (1974) conclude that
bureaucracies become too large according to the government’s preferences and evaluate
these expenditure increases as detrimental. A more recent example of this view is
provided by Fuest (2000) who also discusses the case where politicians have only limited
control over fiscal policy and need to bargain with bureaucrats over the budget. In
his framework welfare unambiguously declines as bureaucrats gain bargaining power.
We, however, find that the influence of bureaucracies can be welfare increasing if pre-
existing political distortions are present and the excess burden of taxation is taken into
account.
A number of recent contributions to the economic literature analyze whether political
agents should rather be appointed or elected. Alesina and Tabellini (2007) investigate
the normative criteria that guide the allocation of a policy task to an elected politician
versus an independent bureaucrat in a career concern model. In a companion paper
with multiple policy tasks, Alesina and Tabellini (2008) come to the conclusion that
bureaucrats are better if short-termism is prevalent. In contrast to their work, our
paper focuses on the interaction between bureaucrats and politicians. The idea that
elections align the interests of the electorate with those of politicians is confirmed
by Besley and Coate (2003) who find evidence that elected regulators are more pro-
consumer oriented than appointed regulators as elections allow to unbundel policy
issues.
The empirical literature on the impact of bureaucrats is very limited. A notable excep-
tion is Rauch (1995) who shows that the establishment of professional bureaucracies
instead of politically appointed bureaucracies was crucial for growth when analyzing
municipal reforms in US cities at the beginning of the 20th century. He argues that
professional bureaucracies increased the time horizon of public decision makers. In a
subsequent investigation, Rauch and Evans (2000) specify the key institutional charac-
teristics of the successful ‘Weberian’ bureaucracy like meritocratic recruitment through
competitive examinations, civil service procedures for hiring and firing rather than po-
litical appointments and dismissals, and filling higher levels of the hierarchy through
internal promotion.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 presents the baseline model of politicians
under electoral constraints and compares the outcome of the political equilibrium to
a normative benchmark. Section 1.3 discusses the incentives bureaucrats face and
incorporates a bureaucracy into the decision-making process. The welfare implications
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of our model are analyzed in section 1.4. Section 1.5 concludes with an outlook on
possible future research.
1.2 The model
In this section, we provide a framework where an age limit for voting inherently distorts
the incentives of elections therefore causing short-term politics.5 For that purpose, we
present a simple probabilistic voting model where the society consists of three groups
of voters belonging to different generations. In the first part of this section, we derive
the political equilibrium and analyze its implications. In the second part, we set up the
social planner’s maximization problem and compare this normative benchmark with
the outcome of the political equilibrium.
1.2.1 Political equilibrium
In our model, voters are backward-looking and decide on whether to reelect an incum-
bent politician. In the first period an incumbent is already in office and decides on
public policies including his rents. In particular, the politician sets a certain tax rate
to finance the provision of a public consumption good and a public investment good.
Elections are held at at the end of the first period. If reelected, the incumbent stays in
office for another term without taking any further action and only receives the benefits
from office as stated below. In the second period citizens also obtain the benefits from
the public investments undertaken in the first period. Thereafter the game ends.
In order to model the idea that the exclusion of young citizens from the electorate
distorts the incentives inherent to elections, we require at least a young generation
which is excluded in the elections and an old generation which does not benefit from
public investments. A further middle-aged generation is necessary to avoid corner
solutions. Accordingly, the society in our setting consists of a continuum of voters
belonging to different generations AJ with J ∈ (y,m, o). In period one, there is a
young generation Ay, a middle-aged generation Am, and an old generation Ao. The
size of each generation is αJ > 0. The total size of the population in period one is
5The general insight of our analysis does not depend on this idea. Alternatively, distortions to-
wards short-term expenditures could also originate from time-inconsistency problems or distributional
conflicts among the electorate (c.f. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991)).
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αy + αm + αo = 1. Each generation ages from period one to period two. Whereas
Ay and Am just grow older, Ao is already deceased in the second period. Finally, we
assume that no new generation enters in the second period. The latter does not restrict
the generality of our results since it is more demanding to reach our conclusions when
abstracting from future generations as will become clearer in the next section.6
For ease of exposition, we assume that the members of all generations receive the
same exogenous income Y in the first period.7 The government levies a proportional
income tax with tax rate τ to finance the provision of two public goods G and I. To
introduce a trade-off between the short run and the long run, we assume that the public
consumption good G increases the utility of voters immediately in period one. Public
investments I, however, do not become effective until the next period. One might
think of subsidies and transfers as public consumption goods and of expenditures for
education and infrastructure as public investment goods.8
In period one all tax revenue is generated and all public goods are provided. Including
the incumbent’s (monetary) rents r the budget constraint of the government in period
one can be written as9
T = αyτY + αmτY + αoτY = τY = G+ I + r. (1)
The individual preferences of the three generations’ members regarding public goods
provision are denoted WJ . Note that these refer to the total payoff of both periods and
are assumed to take the following form:
Wy = Wm = (1− τ)Y +H(G) + δF (I) (2)
and
Wo = (1− τ)Y +H(G), (3)
where HG > 0, HGG < 0 and FI > 0, FII < 0. The parameter δ represents a standard
discount factor necessary to adjust the value of future pay-offs.
The incumbent cares only about (monetary) rents and about being reelected. The
6We also exclude altruism between the different generations which could mitigate the inefficiency
arising in the political equilibrium as discussed below.
7It could equally be assumed that the income of the young generation is lower than that of the
other two. In that case the deviation from the normative benchmark becomes even more pronounced.
8Empirically, the distinction between public consumption and investment may be difficult to draw.
We define G as the sum of all public expenditures that become effective in the short term.
9We assume that tax revenues always suffice to cover the costs of public goods provision.
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monetary rents r are taken from the government’s tax revenues and are therefore
captured in period one. In contrast, the ego rent R which represents the pleasure of
being in power only accrues to the incumbent when remaining in office for another
period. Accordingly, R is exogenously determined and, in particular, independent of
the current level of rent extraction r. The incumbent’s reelection probability P (G, I, r)
is influenced both by the provision the two public goods, G and I, and the level of
rents r. Hence, the incumbent’s pay-off can be written as
Ω = u(r) + δP (G, I, r)R, (4)
where the utility function u captures the incumbent’s valuation of rents with ur >
0, urr < 0. The parameter δ is the same standard discount factor as before.
In line with the existing voting rights regulations in most countries, we assume that
there is an age limit below which individuals are not admitted to elections. At the same
time, we assume that no upper bound for the voting age exists. Importantly for our
model, the young generation Ay is below the voting age limit and hence excluded from
taking part in elections. Empirically, one could think of juveniles as the counterpart
of Ay or all individuals below 18. Yet, for our results to hold it is only necessary
that a part of the society with systematically different preferences from the remaining
individuals is excluded from the electorate. Hence, the electorate in our model only
consists of Am and Ao. These voters base their election decision both on the policies
chosen by the incumbent and on the non policy-related aspects of the incumbent and
his opponent. Specifically, voter i in group J votes for the incumbent if
WJ(G, I, r) + ² ≥ ωJi, (5)
where ² characterizes the average popularity of the incumbent politician relative to
the opponent in the overall population and is assumed to be uniformly distributed on
[− 1
2ψ
, 1
2ψ
].10 The popularity of the incumbent is probabilistic and beyond his influence
like the oil price for a national politician. The higher is the value of ψ, the higher is the
density of swing voters and the more competitive is the election. The parameter ωJi
denotes the threshold level above which a voter favors the incumbent and is assumed
to be uniformly distributed on [− 1
2φJ
, 1
2φJ
], where φ denotes the average reservation
10For the microfoundation of the probability function, we apply a simple reformulation of the
standard probabilistic voting model as proposed by Svaleryd and Vlachos (2007). Regarding the
generalization of the special distributional assumption see Persson and Tabellini (2000, pp. 52 et
seqq.) and Lindbeck and Weibull (1987).
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utility level. The reservation utility level depends on non-policy issues like ideology
or personal characteristics. Note that ωJi is a group-specific parameter, thus the two
groups of voters are allowed to be differently demanding and can differ in their political
influence. Finally, the opposition candidate is assumed to be identical to the incumbent
politician. Hence, the voters’ sole motive for ousting the incumbent is the ex post
punishment of bad policy choices.
Given the previous assumptions, the share of voters from generation AJ voting for the
incumbent is given by
vJ = αJ(
1
2φJ
WJ + ²). (6)
Correspondingly, the incumbent’s total vote share reads
piI =
∑
J
αJ vJ . (7)
Note that the total vote share (7) is a random variable depending on the realized value
of ².11 When making policy decisions, the incumbent only knows the distribution of the
popularity shock ² and of the voters’ threshold utility levels ωJi. Due to the uncertainty
regarding the median voter’s optimal policy, the incumbent’s probability of winning
becomes a smooth function of the policy variables and is given by
P (G, I, r) = Prob[piI ≥ αm + αo
2
] =
1
2
+
ψ
φ
[
∑
J
αJφJWJ(G, I, r)]. (8)
When choosing the optimal policy platform, the incumbent politician takes the above
reelection probability as given and solves the following optimization problem
Max
G,I,r
Ω = u(r) + δP (G, I, r)R. (9)
Since the opponent candidate is assumed to be identical to the incumbent, the equi-
librium policy choices G∗, I∗ and r∗ are characterized by the first-order conditions
resulting from equation (9)
∂Ω
∂G
: HG = 1 (10)
and
∂Ω
∂I
: FI =
αmφm + αoφo
δαmφm
(11)
11The distribution of ² is assumed to be wide enough to rule out corner solutions.
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and
∂Ω
∂r
: ur = δRψ. (12)
Since both groups of voters have identical costs and benefits from the provision of the
public consumption good, condition (10) and the related level of G∗ are independent of
group characteristics. Correspondingly, the incumbent politician provides G such that
the marginal utility of an additional unit equals the constant marginal cost of public
goods. In contrast, the optimal provision of the public investment good I∗ determined
by (11) depends both on the population share of the two groups of voters as well as
on their political influence. Ceteris paribus, I∗ is smaller, the larger is the share and
the stronger is the political influence of the old generation Ao. Moreover, I
∗ is smaller,
the less patient voters are (smaller δ). Condition (12) states that rents in the political
equilibrium, r∗, decrease if the candidates are more patient (δ increases), if the value of
holding office is larger (R increases), or if the uncertainty in the election is reduced (ψ
increases). Intuitively, the uncertainty of the election can be interpreted as a measure
of the intensity of political competition. Finally, r∗ also depends on the characteristics
of the candidates’ utility function u(r).
1.2.2 Pareto efficient policy
To assess the outcome of the political equilibrium, we adopt the perspective of a social
planner. Total welfare naturally includes the utility of the young generation which is
neglected in the electoral process.12 Accordingly, the normative benchmark is given by
the maximization of a utilitarian social welfare function of the following form:
Max
G,I
W = αyWy + αmWm + αoWo (13)
subject to the budget constraint G+ I = T . The corresponding first-best provision of
the two public goods G∗S and I
∗
S is characterized by the subsequent first-order conditions
∂W
∂G
: HG = 1 (14)
and
∂W
∂I
: FI =
1
δ(αy + αm)
. (15)
12From a purely normative perspective it would not matter whether individuals are able to actually
participate in elections.
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Condition (14) states that the efficient amount of the public consumption good G∗S
is defined by the equality of the marginal utility of an additional unit of G and the
marginal costs of public funds. As before, this condition is independent of the differing
characteristics of the three generation as all face the same costs and benefits regarding
G. The efficient amount of the public investment good I∗S depends on the size of the
different generations, but not on their political strength. The latter does not matter in
welfare terms. I∗S declines in the share of the old generation αo and rises in the share
of the young generation αy and the share of the middle-aged generation αm. Moreover,
I∗S is smaller the less patient voters are (smaller δ). As immediately obvious, no rents
exist in the social optimum (r∗S = 0).
The comparison of the normative benchmark and the political equilibrium shows that
the provision of G is efficient in the political equilibrium (G∗ = G∗S) since equations (10)
and (14) are identical. This result is due to our specification that individuals from all
three generations face the same costs and benefits with respect to G. When assessing
the level of I by comparing equations (11) and (15), we find that I∗ is inefficiently low
(I∗ < I∗S) as long as
αmφm + αoφo
αmφm
>
1
(1− αo) . (16)
When assuming that all groups are equally influential (φm = φo), condition (16) is
always fulfilled except for the extreme cases where either αy = 0 or αo = 0, i.e. if
either the old or the young generation does not exist. When considering the case
where all generations are of equal size (αJ = 1/3) which is quite plausible in our
context, we obtain I∗ = I∗S only if φm/φo = 2, i.e. if the middle-aged generation has
twice the political influence of the old generation.13 At that point, the influence of
the middle-aged generation just compensates the negligence of the young generation’s
preferences in the political process. In general, I∗ < I∗S is valid, unless the political
influence of the old generation is low in comparison to its size. Since this is unlikely,
we henceforth assume equally influential groups (φm = φo) which implies I
∗ < I∗S.
The intuition for this result is as follows: As the old generation only finances the public
investment good, but does not benefit from its provision, the incumbent can increase
its vote share among the old generation by distorting public policies towards short-
term valuable expenditures. As no rents are captured in the optimum (r∗S = 0), all
rents accruing to the government in the political equilibrium r∗ constitute a welfare
13Note that the underprovision of I becomes more pronounced, the more influential is the old
generation (the higher is φO).
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loss. As evident from equation (12), this “imperfect agency ”distortion decreases in
the level of political competition. Yet, political competition is obviously no remedy for
the distortion towards public consumption since this distortion is inherent to elections
in our model. To sum up the results until now, we state
Proposition 1 If the young generation is excluded from the electorate, political com-
petition leads to a level of public investment goods which is too low in comparison to
the solution of the social planner. Moreover, the incumbent politician captures rents
which constitutes a pure welfare loss.
1.3 Sharing power with a bureaucracy
In this section, we extend the above model and analyze how the behavior of the incum-
bent politician changes if a second institution, in our case a bureaucracy, influences
policy decisions. In doing so, we build on the idea that the administrative units, which
the government requires in order to actually provide public goods, are to a certain ex-
tent able to influence the allocation of tax revenues. In the first part of this section, we
analyze how the influence of a bureaucracy alters the composition of the public goods
provided. The conditions under which a bureaucracy effectively constrains politicians
are analyzed in the second part.
1.3.1 Impact on public goods provision
So far we have assumed that politicians do not only possess the right to decide on public
policies, but are also able to implement these without any costs. In reality, however,
politicians depend on the expertise and knowledge of bureaucrats when executing their
decisions. Due to this expertise, bureaucrats have an informational advantage which
can be exploited when elaborating drafts or implementing policies. As there is little
scope for exchanging an established bureaucracy, bureaucrats are likely to affect public
policy decisions to their own favor as suggested by Niskanen (1971).
When analyzing the functioning of bureaucracies, economists have generally pointed
out the potential drawbacks of non-elected administrations. Niskanen (1971), for ex-
ample, maintains that bureaucrats are mainly interested in the size of their budget
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which is positively correlated to certain privileges like power. Accordingly, the pres-
ence of bureaucrats leads to excessive public expenditures. In the same way, Kessing
and Konrad (2008) argue that bureaucrats derive utility from the absolute size of the
budget (G+ I in our case). We follow this account and also argue that the influence of
a bureaucracy increases government expenditures. When adding a bureaucrat to our
model, we define his utility function as
B = K(G−G∗) +K(I − I∗), (17)
where KG > 0, KGG < 0 and G
∗ and I∗ are the levels of public goods provision in
the political equilibrium. This specification entails the main characteristic of bureau-
cracies mentioned in the economic literature. At the same time, this formulation is
concise enough to allow the subsequent analysis of the interaction between an incum-
bent politician and a bureaucrat. With the function K(·) we add more structure than
Kessing and Konrad (2008). This ensures that the bureaucrat values both kinds of
expenditures alike and allocates any funds at his disposal equally on both goods. This
specific construction of the bureaucrat’s objective function eases the following analysis
considerably, but is not necessary for our conclusions to hold. For our purpose, we
only require that bureaucrats have at least a small interest in public investment goods
which is highly plausible given the long time horizon of bureaucracies.14
To analyze the interaction between the government and the bureaucrat, we model the
latter as a monopoly bureaucrat. In doing so, we build on the analysis of the separation
of powers by Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997).15 In our case, the government is
forced to adjust its policies, because it needs to seek the bureaucrat’s willingness to
cooperate. Consider the following stylized arrangement: the incumbent proposes a
public-goods spending [G, I]. If the bureaucrat approves the proposal, he cooperates
with the government in implementing the respective policies. If the bureaucrat is
dissatisfied with the proposal, he exploits all his bargaining power in order to boycott
the incumbent’s plans. In that case, the incumbent loses the disposal power over an
amount a > 0 of the budget. The parameter a denotes the bargaining power of the
bureaucrat and might practically be determined both by the size of a bureaucracy
and institutional features like budgeting rules. In addition, resources in the amount of
14Kessing and Konrad (2008) explicitly show that bureaucratic budget competition leads to an
excessive employment of durable production factors. Therefore, one could even justify a specification
of the bureaucrat’s objective function that entails a bias towards public investment expenditures.
15Alternatively, one could generate a similar result via a bargaining model. While being fully
equivalent, the formulation with a monopoly bureaucrat is considerably more tractable.
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x > 0 are lost during the boycott.16
We denote the equilibrium outcome in the case where the incumbent is constrained by
a bureaucrat by G∗B, I
∗
B and r
∗
B. Assume for a moment, that the incumbent sticks to
the policies as derived in section 1.2. Obviously, the corresponding proposal [G∗, I∗] is
rejected by the bureaucrat. Using his bargaining power, the bureaucrat is going to raise
the provision of both public goods up to the default level G¯ = G∗+ a
2
and I¯ = I∗+ a
2
as
implied by the above setting and equation (17). In doing so, the parameter a determines
the mark-up on G∗ and I∗ which the bureaucrat can force the incumbent to concede.17
Due to the costly boycott, the incumbent’s effective rent shrinks to r˜ = r∗ − a − x.
Thus, the incumbent’s best response is to announce the provision of G¯ and I¯ in the
beginning which secures the approval of the bureaucrat and allows to capture a larger
effective rent r˜ = r∗ − a.
Anticipating the bureaucrat’s impact, the incumbent needs to revise his policy propos-
als. Effectively, he cannot do otherwise but announce to provide G∗B = G¯ and I
∗
B = I¯.
Note that G¯ and I¯ are the only public goods policies which can be announced consis-
tently both vis-a-vis the electorate and the bureaucrat.18 At the same time, voters need
to adjust their demands. Though already knowing that the size of public goods exceeds
the political optimum, voters cannot alter their lot as the opponent candidate faces
the same constraint. Hence, G∗B = G
∗ + a
2
and I∗B = I
∗ + a
2
are the equilibrium public
goods provision levels in the case where the incumbent is constrained by a bureaucrat.
We sum up this result in
Proposition 2 The presence of a bureaucracy increases the provision of both public
goods in the political equilibrium.
1.3.2 Impact on rents
Before entering the normative discussion, we first analyze the impact of the presence
of a bureaucracy on the rents of the incumbent politician. We need to determine
the extent to which the incumbent re-optimizes the level of rents, r∗B, under the new
16We assume T > a > x.
17Our formulation implies that the default levels G¯ and I¯ are exogenous to the announcements of
the candidate at stage one (as it is generally the case in the literature on separation of powers).
18In particular, we rule out the possibility that the incumbent announces a public good allocation
of the form [G′ = G∗ − a2 , I ′ = I∗ − a2 ] in order to neutralize the bureaucracy.
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constraints. To start with, we assume that the incumbent continues to choose r∗ and
finances the additional public goods out of “its own”pocket. Yet, with an effective rent
r˜ = r∗ − a condition (12) is no more fulfilled as evident from
ur(r
∗ − a) < δRψ. (18)
Equation (18) clearly indicates that the incumbent is not going to reduce his rents at
all in this setting, i.e. r∗B = r
∗. Consequently, the tax rate has to be increased in
order to finance the additional expenditures in the amount of a. Note that the decision
regarding r does not affect the levels of public goods provided as the bureaucrat always
forces the incumbent politician to provide G∗B = G¯ and I
∗
B = I¯.
The result that the presence of a bureaucracy does not restrict the incumbent politician
depends on the availability of a tax that is free of any distortions. In reality, however,
taxation is not costless since citizens undertake unproductive activities in order to
avoid or to reduce taxes causing the so-called excess burden. Since more tax revenue
can only be generated by taxing increasingly less suitable sources, the excess burden is
not constant but increases in the level of taxation. To account for the excess burden in
our model, we assume that taxes in the amount of (1+κ) need to be collected in order
to generate one unit of tax revenue. Moreover, κ is specified as an increasing function
of T . Accordingly, the budget constraint of the government becomes:
T = (1 + κ)(I +G+ r), (19)
where κ(T ) with κT > 0 and κTT > 0, i.e. the marginal excess burden increases in the
level of taxation. This formulation implies that additional funds become increasingly
more expensive for the incumbent politician.19
Of course, with the additional cost of taxation, the new optimal level of rents r∗ in the
unconstrained political equilibrium is lower than without an excess burden. The same
holds true for the levels of public goods provision which are generally lower than up
till now. The only qualitatively important change in our analysis concerns the level
of rents captured by the incumbent politician in the constrained political equilibrium.
Let us denote the corresponding equilibrium rent in the presence of a bureaucracy and
under the consideration of the excess burden of taxation by rBE. When being forced by
19Alternatively, one could argue that voters are averse to excess expenditures like the incumbent
politician’s rent and the bureaucrat’s mark-up. See Svaleryd and Vlachos (2007) who introduce a
similar cost which depends on whether voters are informed or not.
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the bureaucracy to increase the provision of public goods, the incumbent has to decide
whether to finance the additional expenditures by increasing taxes or by reducing his
own rents. With an excess burden cost of taxation, the incumbent is still not willing
to give up an amount a of his equilibrium rents (implying rBE = r
∗ − a) in order to
keep taxes at the previous level (T = T ∗) since
ur(r
∗ − a)
1 + κr(T ∗)
> δRψ. (20)
At the same time, it is no more optimal for the incumbent to compensate the impact
of the bureaucrat fully by increasing taxes up to Tˆ > T ∗ in order to secure rBE = r∗
since
ur(r
∗)
1 + κr(Tˆ )
< δRψ. (21)
As a consequence, rBE needs to be between r
∗ − a and r∗ while the tax rate increases
less than in the case without an excess burden of taxation. Thus, the introduction
of a bureaucrat does not only lead to an improved provision of public goods but also
reduces rents when considering the excess burden of taxation. The exact level of rBE
depends on the curvature of u and κ. Ceteris paribus, the steeper κ is, the more
limited is the leeway of the incumbent. Intuitively, the incumbent can obtain a larger
rent without the bureaucrat, because the marginal cost of public funds is comparatively
small as long as taxes are low. The bureaucrat, however, already causes expenditures
to rise well above optimal levels. Hence, the incumbent faces a higher marginal cost
of capturing rents in the constrained case, i.e. more votes are lost for each additional
unit of rents. We can state
Proposition 3 When considering the excess burden of taxation, the additional expen-
ditures necessary for the increase in public goods provision are partly financed at the
cost of the incumbent politician’s rents.
To illustrate the above outcome, we provide an analytical example by assuming specific
functional forms of u and t. When, e.g. u(r) = br − b
2
r2 and κ(T ) = dT + d
2
T 2, with
b, d ∈ [0, 1] and T = G∗ + I∗ + a+ r, we obtain the following explicit solution20
rBE =
b− d(δRψ)(1 + Θ)
b+ d(δRψ)
, (22)
20To rule out negative rents, b needs to be sufficiently large, i.e. b > d(δRψ)(1 + a).
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where Θ = G∗ + I∗ + a. Taking the candidates’ utility function as given, the level of
rents decreases in the parameter d as evident from
∂rBE
∂d
= −(2 + a)bδRψ
(b+ dδRψ)2
< 0. (23)
Equation (23) displays that the taxation technology, in particular the characteristics of
the marginal excess burden, determines the level of rents r. The more the excess burden
grows as total expenditures increase, the lower are the incumbent’s rents. Empirically,
the extent to which the government can compensate the influence of the bureaucracy by
increasing its rents might depend on the taxation technology and further institutional
factors.
1.4 The beneficial welfare effects of a bureaucracy
We have seen that the incorporation of a bureaucracy tends to increase public expendi-
tures. This result is in line with the previous literature on bureaucrats which generally
regarded the additional expenditures as a waste of resources. Fuest (2000), for ex-
ample, analyzes a model where politicians need to bargain with bureaucrats over the
budget. In his framework, which only focuses on the absolute level of public expendi-
tures, welfare unambiguously declines as bureaucrats gain bargaining power since the
latter increase public spending beyond the socially optimal level. Yet, in our setting
the normative implications are not necessarily negative. We take into account that
political competition might lead to suboptimal policy choices and that the presence of
a bureaucracy might constrain an incumbent’s ability to capture rents. For these two
potential positive side-effects, the influence of a bureaucracy might be beneficial up to
a certain extent.
The first question to ask when evaluating the changes induced by the introduction of a
bureaucrat, is whether its impact is at least beneficial at the margin, i.e. when starting
from a situation where the incumbent is unconstrained (a = 0). Consequently, we are
interested in the change in total welfare W at G∗, I∗ and r∗ if a increases marginally.
In general, this effect is determined by
∂W (G∗, I∗, r∗)
∂a
= (−1 +HG(G∗))1
2
+ (1− αo)(−1 + δFI(I∗))1
2
− ∂r
∂a
. (24)
As displayed in equation (24), the overall effect of a change in the bargaining power
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of the bureaucrat depends on two issues: First, its effect on provision of public goods,
and second, its effect on the level of total rents r.
To isolate the first beneficial effect of a bureaucracy, let us abstract from the excess
burden of taxation. In that case, we can ignore the impact of the bureaucrat’s bargain-
ing power on the rents appropriated by the incumbent since these remain unaffected
by the bureaucracy, i.e. ∂r
∂a
= 0. Therefore, the welfare effect of the bureaucracy only
depends on its impact on the provision of public goods. This allows us to put forward
the following line of arguments: As public consumption is provided optimally when
the incumbent politician determines policies alone, a marginal increase in its provision
has no first-order welfare effects. Yet, the marginal increase in public investment is
a first-order gain as public investment is underprovided in the beginning. Hence, the
first beneficial effect of a bureaucracy consists in an improved level of public investment
goods.
The second beneficial effect of a bureaucracy becomes evident when considering the
excess burden of taxation. As shown in subsection 1.3.2, the increasing cost of taxation
forces the incumbent to finance a part of the increase in public goods at the expense
of “his own”rents which effectively reduces the marginal costs of public funds. Hence,
an increase in the bargaining power of the bureaucrats effectively constrains the in-
cumbent’s ability to capture rents in addition to the increase in public investments as
discussed above. Thus, a bureaucracy becomes even more valuable. We sum up our
results in
Proposition 4 When starting from a = 0, a marginal rise in the bureaucrat’s bargain-
ing power increases voters’ overall welfare for two reasons: First, due to the improved
provision of public investment goods, and second due to the additional constraint im-
posed on the incumbent politician. Proof see Appendix.
Evidently, the benefit of an increase in public investment due to the bureaucrat’s influ-
ence is less important, the higher the previously existing level of public investment is.
At the same time, the costs of excessively supplying public consumption increase in the
level of public consumption. Consequently, the above result is only valid if the bureau-
cracy’s bargaining power is limited. At some point, the cost of excessively providing G
just compensates the benefit from improving the level of I. The corresponding optimal
influence level of the bureaucrat, a∗, is determined by the maximization of the total
welfare in the constrained political equilibrium with respect to the bureaucrat’s level
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of influence, i.e.
Max
a
W (G∗B, I
∗
B, r
∗
B) (25)
which yields
∂W
∂a
= HG(G
∗ +
a
2
)− 1 + δ(1− αo)FI(I∗ + a
2
)− 1 + ∂r
∂a
= 0. (26)
Equation (26) illustrates the above argument that the optimal level of a bureaucracy’s
influence needs to be strictly limited. When starting from a = 0, HG(·) − 1 becomes
more and more negative as a increases due to HGG < 0. At the same time the positive
FI(·) − 1 becomes smaller as a increases due to FII < 0. When accounting for the
excess burden of taxation, the second beneficial effect of bureaucracies needs to be
taken into account. Since ∂r
∂a
> 0 the optimal level is strictly higher in the latter case.
The intuition is as follows: When abstracting from the excess burden of taxation, the
beneficial effect of the bureaucracy is due to inefficient provision of public investments
in the underlying political equilibrium. With an excess burden of taxation, the bu-
reaucracy puts an additional constraint on the incumbent which limits his ability to
capture rents.
To prove the existence of an optimum, we need to consider the second-order condition
of the above maximization problem which reads
∂2W
∂a2
=
1
2
[HGG(G
∗ +
a
2
) + (1− αo)FII(I∗ + a
2
)] +
∂2r
∂a2
. (27)
Since FGG < 0 and FII < 0, an optimal level of the bureaucrat’s influence a
∗ exists as
long as ∂
2r
∂a2
≤ 0. Intuitively, the benefit from constraining the incumbent’s tendency
to capture rents by the presence of a bureaucracy needs to be decreasing or at least
constant in the level of the bureaucracy’s influence. This assures that the excessive
expenditures caused by the bureaucracy outweigh its benefits at some point which is
empirically highly plausible. Proposition 5 summarizes this result.
Proposition 5 There exists an optimal influence level of a bureaucracy which is
strictly higher when the excess burden of taxation is taken into account.
The relationship between the optimal level of influence of a bureaucracy a∗ and the
size of the old generation αo is obtained from equation (26) by means of the implicit
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function theorem which yields
∂a∗
∂αo
= − (1− α0)δFII(I
∗ + a
2
) ∂I
∗
∂αo
− δFI(I∗ + a2)
1
2
[HGG(G∗ + a2) + (1− αo)FII(I∗ + a2)] + ∂
2r
∂a2
(28)
Note that the denominator is the second order condition of the above maximization
problem as displayed in equation (27). Accordingly the sign of ∂a
∂αo
is given by the sign
of the nominator of equation (28). Intuitively, the relationship between the optimal
level of influence of a bureaucracy a∗ and the size of the old generation αo depends
both on the effect of αo on the socially optimal level of public investments I
∗
S and on
the effect of αo on the level of public investments in the political equilibrium I
∗. In
the end, the difference between I∗S and I
∗ determines the welfare improving potential
of a bureaucracy and hence a∗. The nominator of equation (28) indicates that ∂a
∂αo
> 0
is more likely, the stronger is the impact of αo on the level of public investments in the
political equilibrium I∗ (strongly negative ∂I
∗
∂αo
) and the more important is this effect
in utility terms (strongly negative FII(I
∗ + a
2
)). Of course, in welfare terms this effect
needs to be discounted by (1 − αo) the relative size of the young and middle-aged
population. The impact of αo on the socially optimal level of public investments I
∗
S is
also taken into account by δFI(I
∗+ a
2
) which represents the reduced necessity of public
investments for a each marginal increase in αo.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper starts from the observation that public budgets in many countries are bi-
ased towards consumption expenditures. We set up a model in which this feature
results from electoral competition in a society where the young generation is excluded
from the electorate. Under these circumstances, the same electoral constraints that
discipline politicians on the one hand, induce them to allocate too many resources to
present consumption and too little to public investment. Bureaucrats, however, are
not directly responsible to voters, but appointed for lifetime. The corresponding in-
sensitivity regarding the interests of voters induces an increase of public expenditures.
Consequently, the influence of bureaucrats leads to a beneficial mix of distortions where
the political bias towards present expenditures is mitigated by the expenditure bias of
bureaucrats. Moreover, we find that the additional expenditures caused by the bu-
reaucracy reduce the incumbent’s ability to capture rents when considering the excess
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burden of taxation.
We conclude that the independence of bureaucracies from political competition does
not always need to be detrimental - even though it gives rise to an expenditure bias.
Given that elections tend to make politics short-sighted, an independent bureaucracy
might even be welfare enhancing. In other words, bureaucrats’ limited necessity of
being responsible to the electorate does not only have a negative impact on the size of
the public budget as in our model. It also creates a long-term perspective which might
be highly valuable in an environment of fierce political competition. Moreover, we find
that the presence of a bureaucracy reduces the ability of the incumbent politician to
capture rents.
Our finding demonstrates that the welfare effects of institutions like the bureaucracy
need to be considered in the broader context of public decision-making, i.e. in the
context of the interaction between different political agents. Furthermore, our model
offers a way to reconcile Rauch’s empirical results with Niskanen’s view of budget-
expanding bureaucrats. A small and limited level of bureaucratic influence generates
Rauch’s results, whereas an excessive influence confirms Niskanen’s hypothesis.
The above model can be extended to a multi-period model where a new type of political
business cycle could be derived. If some investments yield a return during the period
in which the elected government is in power, we would expect that the bias towards
present consumption increases as the election date is appraoching. This implication
could be tested empirically.
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1.6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4
Given the definition of the bureaucrats’ default levels as defined in section 1.3.1, we
can easily derive ∂G
∂a
= 1/2 and ∂I
∂a
= 1/2 as displayed in equation (24).
From section 1.2, we know that HG(G
∗) = 1 and FI(I∗) > 1δ +
α1O−α1Y
(α1Y +α
1
M )δ
.
Correspondingly, we can state ∂W (G
∗,I∗,r∗)
∂G
= 0 and ∂W (G
∗,I∗,r∗)
∂I
> 0 which completes
our proof of ∂W (G
∗,I∗,r∗)
∂a
> 0.
Chapter 2
Foreign aid and political
accountability
2.1 Introduction
The effectiveness of foreign aid is highly controversial. Widespread instances of inef-
ficient usage and waste of resources have alerted donor organizations like the World
Bank to re-think their foreign aid management.1 Weak institutional frameworks, es-
pecially corruption and a lack of political accountability, are most frequently cited
as a reason for the ineffectiveness of aid.2 However, it is not thoroughly scrutinized
whether foreign aid also has a (possibly negative) impact on institutional quality it-
self. In the case of democratic countries, foreign aid might undermine the link between
the government’s performance and the political outcomes thereby prolonging the time
incompetent politicians stay in office.
This paper investigates the conditions under which foreign emergency aid undermines
political accountability in development countries. For that purpose we set up a simple
retrospective voting model with differently informed groups of voters where an elected
incumbent in the recipient country decides on the level of investments in disaster pre-
vention and relief infrastructure. Within this framework, we analyze the relationship
between emergency aid and the incumbent politician’s accountability vis-a-vis the elec-
torate. Our main proposition is that the quality of governance is most likely to dete-
1C.f. World Bank (1998).
2See e.g. Svensson (1999), Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Collier and Dollar (2002).
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riorate when donors offer unconditional and unlimited support since this secures the
votes of the ill-informed vulnerable voters for the incumbent independent of his actual
performance.
The natural starting point for the discussion of political accountability issues are polit-
ical agency models where imperfectly informed voters constrain self-interested politi-
cians by threatening not to reelect them.3 We adapt this framework as proposed by
Persson and Tabellini (2000) to the developing world by explicitly modeling the salient
characteristics of aid-dependent countries. Most importantly, we consider differently
informed groups of voters when analyzing the impact of foreign aid on political account-
ability.4 There are many reasons why poor and vulnerable citizens are considerably
less informed than richer citizens, in particular poorer citizens tend to be ill-educated.
This issue is particularly relevant in development countries where poor and vulnerable
people make up a large fraction of the population. Moreover, information gaps are gen-
erally more pronounced in these countries due to larger economic and social differences
between urban and rural areas.
The second important feature of developing countries considered in our analysis is the
frequent occurrence of natural disasters. In our model, diasters destroy the income of
citizens, but the incumbent politician can undertake investments in disaster prevention
and relief infrastructure which influence the probability of natural disasters and the
extent of damage. As the uninformed part of the electorate does not observe the actions
taken by the incumbent politician directly, its current economic situation determines its
voting decision. Thus, these voters learn something about the incumbent politician’s
effort if a disaster occurs. By providing emergency aid, international donors insure
the incumbent at least partly against the political risk that uninformed voters who are
affected by a disaster detect the government’s negligence. Hence, our main result is
that foreign emergency aid weakens the incentives provided by electoral constraints.
However, our analysis shows that this results depends on whether the effort of the
incumbent affects the probability of disasters or the extent of damage. We also analyze
the impact of changes in the share of informed voters on the accountability of the
government. We find that the incumbent’s performance shrinks when the fraction of
uninformed voters rises.
Our analysis yields a number of testable implications regarding the possible effect of aid
3For an overview of the political agency literature see Besley (2006).
4Besley and Burgess (2002) also build their analysis on the idea that a part of the electorate is
ill-informed about the actions of the incumbent politician.
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on the quality of governance. We start to test the resulting hypotheses in the second
part of this chapter by exploiting the fact that the pattern of foreign aid giving is
partly determined by political and strategic considerations. Alesina and Dollar (2000)
show empirically that strategic considerations are crucial determinants of foreign aid.
Kuziemko and Werker (2006) find that the amount of aid received from the United
States increases by 59 percent when a country rotates onto the UN Security Council. In
a similar vein, Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland (forthcoming) find evidence that temporary
members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the World Bank.
Building on these insights, we propose to employ the voting pattern in the UN Assembly
as an instrument for development aid in order to identify the impact of foreign aid on
political accountability.
The literature on the linkage between foreign aid and political accountability is very
limited. The only existing theoretical contributions are Svensson (2000) and Cohen
and Werker (2007).Svensson (2000) analyzes the relationship between corruption and
foreign aid in a rent-seeking model and emphasizes that the mere expectation of aid may
suffice to increase rent-seeking. In contrast to his analysis, we focus on a model where
the main determinant of the government’s policies are elections rather than a group
contest. Cohen and Werker (2007) scrutinize the impact of foreign aid on disaster
prevention by a national government. In their model the probability of a shock is
exogenous and the government can only influence the shock’s impact by preventive
and palliative spending. The crucial issue in their analysis remains whether these
two means are substitutes or complements. In contrast to our approach, Cohen and
Werker (2007) do not provide an explicit model of the political process, instead the
government maximizes a social welfare function. Both Svensson (2000) and Cohen and
Werker (2007) do not capture our central idea that electoral constraints are weakened
by the provision of emergency relief because it (partly) ensures the government against
the risk of losing votes in case a disaster occurs. When analyzing the importance of
the media for the responsiveness of local governments in India, Besley and Burgess
(2002) also argue that having a more informed electorate strengthens incentives for
governments to be responsive. However, they focus on the importance of the media in
providing information and do not offer an explicit analysis of the voting behavior of
differently informed citizens. Finally, our paper contributes to the literature on foreign
aid, its effectiveness, its determinants and its impact.5
5See e.g. Svensson (1999), Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Collier (1997). Note that our model
deals with the relationship between emergency aid to countries affected by a disaster and not about
permanent aid payments.
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Knack (2001) tests whether aid dependency can potentially undermine the quality
of governance by weakening accountability and encouraging rent-seeking in a cross-
country study based on International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) ranking in the period
from 1982 to 1995. He finds that aid significantly reduces a country’s ranking in the
ICRG when instrumenting aid with different economic and political variables. Our
paper differs from his work in two respects: First, we provide a formal argument for the
different ways in which aid affects accountability. Second, our identification strategy
employs political variables as an instrument instead of economic variables since the
latter are unlikely to solve the underlying endogeneity problems. Finally, we use a
different indicator of the quality of governance and focus on a more recent time period.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 presents a retrospective voting models
with differently informed groups of voters and analyzes the impact of foreign emergency
aid on political accountability. In section 2.3 we discuss an identification strategy which
could be suitable to test the predictions of our theoretical model and present some
results regarding the use of different potential instruments. Section 2.4 concludes with
an outlook on possible future research.
2.2 The model
In this section, we present a simple probabilistic voting model where a part of the
electorate remains uninformed about the actions of the incumbent. These uninformed
voters base their voting decision on their actual economic situation which is only partly
determined by the government’s policies, but also partly influenced by the actions of
international donor organizations.
Consider a retrospective voting model with two periods. In the beginning an incumbent
politician is already in office and decides on the government’s policies. At the end of
the first period an election is held where the voters evaluate the performance of the
incumbent relative to a challenger. If reelected, the incumbent stays in office for another
term without taking any further action and only receives the benefits from office as
stated below. Thereafter the game ends.6
All voters start with an exogenous income Y = Y¯ , but experience a negative income
6The only purpose of the second period is to explicitly model the incumbent’s incentives when
deciding on the government’s policies in the face of the elections.
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shock with probability δ ∈ [0, 1] in the first period - after the incumbent has made
his policy decisions, but before the election takes place. We assume that the complete
income is lost in case of a shock. Thus, voters fully depend on the relief σ provided by
the government, i.e. Y = σ.7 The shock could be interpreted as a natural disaster like
a drought, flood or famine, or alternatively as an economic downturn, and the initial
income might consist in the means for subsistence production which are destroyed by
the disaster.
In our model, the government can influence the expected damage of natural disasters
by actions undertaken at the beginning of the first period. In doing so, we consider
two cases: In the first case, the government can influence the probability of the shock.
Thus, we interpret the government’s action e as an investment in prevention which
reduces the probability that a disaster occurs, i.e. δe < 0. Moreover, we assume
that the marginal impact of these preventive measures decrease in the existing level,
i.e. δee > 0. In practice, such measures might consist in the provision of a back-up
water supply, the construction of dykes, etc.8 In the second case, the government can
influence the extent of the potential damage by choosing appropriate policies at the
beginning of period one. Since we are not interested in the appropriateness of the
actions of a government in case of a disaster, we regard the amount of emergency relief
that the incumbent can offer in case of a disaster as determined by exogenous factors.
At the time where a disasters occurs, the government can offer its voters a certain given
amount of relief which might consist in food storage, emergency shelter, etc. However,
the government can increase the effectiveness of its support by investments undertaken
at the beginning of period one, i.e. before the shock actually occurs. Accordingly, e
is now interpreted as investments in infrastructure which increase the effective relief
σ(e, ·) provided. Intuitively, such investments might consist in the construction of roads
which ease the support for citizens living in remote areas.
Crucially for our analysis, the economic situation of the citizens affected by a disaster
can also be influenced by the actions of international donor organizations. As today’s
donor organization are both financially powerful and well-organized, we assume that
the emergency aid a directly increases the relief provided by the national government.
7Without altering our results, one could also assume that only the non-informed voters or a
subgroup of these are affected by the shock like in Besley and Burgess (2002).
8The investments in disaster prevention could also be interpreted as the enforcement of rules like
building regulations which is costly since the government foregoes bribes when being strict.
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Accordingly, the effective relief σ becomes
σ =
{
σ(a) in case 1
σ(a, e) in case 2.
(1)
with σa > 0, σe > 0. Note that a is the contribution of the donor agency and e the
infrastructure investment by the incumbent politician. The donor agencies might be
public institutions like the World Bank or private agencies. Empirically, their impact
on an affected country’s well-being in case of a disaster is considerable, in particular in
cases which gain a lot of attention in the media like the Boxing Day tsunami in 2004.
On the other hand, we rule out the possibility that donor agencies directly affect the
probability of a disaster since international donors provide little support for preventive
measures (see e.g. Benson and Clay (2004)). Obviously, it is more difficult for aid
agencies to collect donations for preventive measures than for emergency aid.
As explained before, the main policy choice of the incumbent consists in preventive
investments (case 1) and infrastructure investments (case 2). The incumbent himself,
however, cares only about his (monetary) rents r and about being reelected. The
monetary rents r stem from the government’s tax revenues and are therefore captured
in period one. In contrast, the ego rent R represents the pleasure of being in power and
only accrues to the incumbent when remaining in office for another period. Accordingly,
R is exogenously determined and, in particular, independent of the current level of rent
extraction r. The incumbent refrains from capturing high rents in period one since
voters might punish him in the upcoming election if they detect his negligence. This in
turn reduces an incumbent’s chance of holding office for a second term and obtaining the
associate value of holding office R. Formally, this link is captured by the incumbent’s
reelection probability P (e) which is derived below. In sum, the incumbent’s pay-off Ω
can be written as
Ω = r + P (e)R. (2)
As indicated by equation (2), the discount factor to adjust the value of future the
potential pay-off in the second period is set to equal one.
To simplify our analysis, we regard the government budget as exogenous.9 Thus, the
9One could argue that this assumption is particularly innocuous in our context since developing
countries obtain a considerable amount of public revenues from tariffs and permanent aid transfers.
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government’s budget (including the incumbent’s rents) reads
T = e+ r.10 (3)
As a consequence, the incumbent politician’s rents are the residual remaining after
financing the investments e.
In the election, voters decide on whether to reelect the incumbent politician. As is usual
in retrospective voting models, we assume the opposition candidate to be identical to
the incumbent politician. Hence, the voters’ sole motive for ousting the incumbent
is the ex-post punishment of bad policy choices. Particular to our model, a fraction
γ < 1
2
of voters are informed about the policies chosen by the incumbent and condition
their voting decision on his actual performance. In contrast, the uninformed voters
comprising (1− γ) of the population are not able to gather the information necessary
for a deliberate choice and thus vote according to their current economic situation.
In principle, the uninformed voters could get informed, but this might simply be too
costly. Practically, one might think of the first group as urban inhabitants with access
to different information sources and an adequate level of education to assess a govern-
ment’s performance thoroughly. In contrast, the latter ill-informed group represents
the rural population that might be illiterate or without reliable information sources.
Thus this group can only learn an incumbent’s performance by experiencing the impact
of his policies on its economic situation.
In our model the voting decision of individuals from both groups is also influenced by
non-policy related aspects of the candidates and by an uncertain overall popularity of
the incumbent. This ensures that the resulting reelection functions becomes a smooth
function of the policy variables as standard in the probabilistic voting framework. The
inherent bias of the electorate towards one or the other candidate is described by
the parameter ωi which is assumed to be uniformly distributed on [0, K]. K denotes
the best alternative offered by the opponent to each of the two groups. The average
popularity of the incumbent politician relative to the opponent in the overall population
is denoted η and assumed to be uniformly distributed on [− 1
2ψ
, 1
2ψ
].11 The popularity of
the incumbent is probabilistic and beyond his influence like the oil price for a national
politician. The higher is the value of ψ, the higher is the density of swing voters and
the more competitive is the election.
10We assume that tax revenues always suffice to finance the government expenditures plus rents.
11Regarding the generalization of the special distributional assumption see Persson and Tabellini
(2000) and Linbeck and Weibull (1987).
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The informed voters base their election decision both on the policies chosen by the
incumbent and non policy-related aspects of the incumbent relative to the opponent.
We assume that the informed voters condition their voting decision on the incumbent’s
performance by offering a linear incentive scheme. Specifically, voter i in group I votes
for the incumbent if
βe+ ωi + η ≥ K, (4)
where β represents the steepness of the linear incentive scheme. To illustrate equation
(4), let us abstract from η and assume β = 1 for a moment. Then, the voter who
favors the incumbent most (due to non-policy related issues), ωi = K, will even opt
for the incumbent if it does not undertake any investments (e = 0). On the other
hand, the voter who dislikes the incumbent most (ωi = 0) only opts for the incumbent
government if it does not capture any rents (e = T ). Although the well-informed voters
might also be affected by a possible shock, they always know whether the incumbent is
actually responsible. Having a perfect signal of the incumbent’s performance, the best
they can do is to condition their voting decision on this signal.12 When going back
to the general formulation of equation (4), the share of informed voters opting for the
incumbent is given by
si =
βe+ η
K
. (5)
Central to our model, the uninformed voters do not directly observe the incumbent’s
performance, but evaluate their immediate economic situation when deciding whom to
elect. Similar as before, voter i in group N votes for the incumbent if
Y + ωi + η ≥ K. (6)
To illustrate equation (6), we again abstract from the overall popularity η. Then, the
voter who favors the incumbent most, ωi = K, even opts for the incumbent if no relief
is provided in case of a shock. On the other hand, the voter who dislikes the incumbent
most (ωi = 0) only opts for the incumbent if it makes him as well off as in a situation
without the shock. In general, the less able is the government in providing adequate
help, the more non-informed voters realize that tax revenues were wasted another way
and vote for the opponent. However, the non-informed voters cannot differentiate
between the case where the government provided support and where an international
12The informed voters might also reward the incumbent for attaining foreign emergency aid. We
argue that they know that the dependence from foreign donors is not sustainable in the long-term
and therefore only reward improvements of their expected income which are due to the incumbent’s
performance.
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donor steps in compensating the insufficient preparations of the government. This
implies that many non-informed voters continue to support an incumbent politician
with a bad performance as long as international donors provide sufficient emergency
aid in case a disaster occurs. When refering to general formulation of equation (6), the
share of non-informed voters opting for the incumbent reads
sn =
{
Y¯+η
K
if no shock occurs
σ+η
K
if a shock occurs.
(7)
Accordingly, the total vote share of the incumbent is given by
s(α, β, e, a) = [γ
βe+ η
K
+ (1− γ)[δσ + η
K
+ (1− δ) Y¯ + η
K
]. (8)
Note that the vote share (8) is a random variable since it depends on the realized value
of η which the incumbent does not know when deciding on the policy variable e. The
incumbent is only aware of the distribution of the popularity shock η (and of the voters’
individual preferences ωi). Due to the uncertainty regarding the median voter’s optimal
policy, the incumbent’s probability of winning becomes a smooth function of the policy
variables. In particular, the incumbent wins the election if s > 1
2
. Accordingly, the
probability that the incumbent is reelected can be derived as
P (e) = Prob[s ≥ 1/2] = 1
2
+ ψ[γβe+ (1− γ)[δσ + (1− δ)Y¯ ]− 1
2
K]. (9)
Intuitively, the incumbent faces a trade-off between capturing rents in period one and
getting the value of another term in office.13 Correspondingly. the policies chosen by
the incumbent are determined by the following maximization problem14
Max
e
Ω = r + P (e)R (10)
s.t. T = e+ r. (11)
13We restrict attention to interior solutions where the incumbent is neither reelected nor ousted
for sure. Therefore, we need to assume that the distribution of η is assumed to be wide enough to
rule out corner solutions which imply that the optimal investment level is always zero.
14Remember that the opponent candidate is assumed to be identical to the incumbent politician.
Foreign Aid and Political Accountability 39
2.2.1 Investments in disaster prevention
Let us first look at the case where the incumbent politician can influence the probability
of disasters by preventive measures undertaken at the beginning of period one. The
corresponding first-order condition which determines the optimal level of investment
in disaster prevention e∗ is derived from equation (10) and reads
∂Ω
∂e
= γβ + (1− γ)[δe(σ(a)− Y¯ )] = 1
ψR
. (12)
From equation (12) the sign of the impact of foreign emergency aid payments on the
level of preventive measures can be derived by means of the implicit function theorem
∂e
∂a
= − δeσa
δee(σ − Y¯ ) < 0. (13)
As the relief in case of a shock cannot exceed the initial income systematically, i.e.
σ < Y¯ , we find a negative relationship between foreign aid and investment. Intuitively,
the donor agency effectively provides an insurance against the political consequences of
a disaster thereby reducing the incentives of the incumbent to improve public policies.
The incumbent exploits his additional leeway by capturing more rents for himself. In
other words the government underinvests in disaster prevention when it knows that it
will be bailed out in case a disaster occurs.
In the same way we can determine how the level of investments in disaster prevention
changes if the size of the informed voters increases:
∂e
∂γ
= −β − δe(σ − Y¯ )
δee(σ − Y¯ ) > 0, (14)
as long as β > δe[σ − Y¯ ], i.e. as long as the incentive scheme offered by the informed
voters is steep enough, the investment in disaster prevention (the level of rents taken)
by the incumbent is the higher, the smaller is the fraction of uninformed voters. At the
same time, the stronger is the incentive scheme (the higher is β), the higher is the level
of disaster prevention e. Of course, this result is reversed if the reward offered by the
informed voters is less than the benefit in terms of votes when improving the expected
economic situation for all voters. The intuition for this result is straightforward: the
agency problem only occurs because some voters are uninformed. Since informed voters
can control the incumbent better than uninformed ones, an increase in the number of
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informed voters reduces the moral hazard problem.15
Moreover, the comparative static analysis yields the prediction that the level of e is
larger, the more valuable is holding office (high R) and the stiffer the competition for
office (high ψ).
Proposition 6 The level of preventive investments e is the higher (a) the smaller is the
amount of emergency aid provided by the international donor organization (low a)(b)
the larger is the fraction of informed voters (high γ); (c) the steeper is the incentive
scheme offered by the informed voters (high β); (d) the higher is the value of holding
office; and (e) the stiffer is political competition (high ψ).
2.2.2 Investments in relief infrastructure
Now we consider the case where the incumbent politician can influence the extent of
damage in case of a disaster by infrastructure investments undertaken at the beginning
of period one. The corresponding first-order condition which determines the optimal
level of infrastructure investments e∗ can be derived from equation (10) and reads
∂Ω
∂e
= γβ + (1− γ)δσe = 1
ψR
. (15)
The impact of foreign aid on the level of infrastructure investments is obtained from
equation (15) by exploiting the implicit function theorem which yields
∂e
∂a
= −σea
σee
. (16)
Obviously, the sign of equation (16) depends on the functional properties of σ.
Whereas, we can easily assume σee < 0, the sign of σae is less definite and depends on
whether a and e are substitutes or complements. Since the infrastructure investments
e increase the impact of the government’s relief, it is also plausible that a and e are
complements. A better road system does not only ease the government’s support for
the voters affected by a disaster, but also facilitates the actions of donor agencies when
15Note that both results are robust to different alternative specifications, in particular we can
stipulate a convex cost function for the provision of infrastructure investment e like c(e) with ce >
0, cee > 0. Such a specification is equivalent to saying that the incumbent’s marginal valuation of
rents decreases in its level.
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providing emergency aid. In that case, we find that an increase in emergency aid a
triggers a higher level of infrastructure investments e. Intuitively, the moral hazard
problem is partly mitigated since the aid flow renders the investment in infrastructure
more valuable.
Finally, we analyze the impact of the size of informed voters on the level of infras-
tructure investments in the same way as before. Analog to the previous analysis, we
obtain
∂e
∂γ
= −β − δσe
σee
> 0. (17)
As before, we find that the level of infrastructure investments increases in the size of
informed voters as long as the incentive scheme is steep enough. We can thus state
Proposition 7 As long as the government’s infrastructure investments and foreign
emergency aid are complements, the level of infrastructure investments e2 is the higher
(a) the larger is the amount of emergency aid provided by the international donor orga-
nization (low a) if e2 and a are complements (b) the larger is the fraction of informed
voters (high γ).
The above analysis shows foreign aid actually can impair the accountability of govern-
ments in aid-recipient countries. However, we also find that under certain conditions,
foreign aid might even improve the incentives of the government. The impact of the
share of informed citizens is always positive in our model. Empirically, one might ex-
pect that foreign aid affects different kinds of expenditures in a distinct way. Whether
such a detailed prediction can be confirmed in an empirical study is not entirely certain.
For the time being, we are only interested in determining the total effect of foreign aid
on political accountability as following in section 2.3.
2.3 Empirical analysis
In the empirical part of this chapter we test the basic implication of the model discussed
in the previous section. In particular, we analyze whether foreign aid payments entail
a negative impact on the accountability of governments. However, the identification
of this effect is far from being trivial: Corrupt and incompetent governments are a
potential reason for weak economic conditions and hence induce foreign aid payments
which are intended to support citizens from suffering under bad conditions. As a
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consequence, the identification of the impact of foreign aid on the accountability of
governments is obstructed by the evident endogeneity of foreign aid. To overcome this
problem, we employ two different instruments for foreign aid (infant mortality and UN
voting) and discuss their appropriateness.
2.3.1 Estimation approach
The main aim of our empirical analysis is to test whether foreign aid undermines the
political accountability of governments in recipient countries. For that purpose, we
estimate the effect of foreign aid on a measure of accountability in a sample of aid
receiving countries based on the following structural equation:
ACit = αPCODAit + β2Xit + θi + τt + uit (18)
where ACit measures the political accountability of a government in country i in year t
and PCODAit is the amount of official development aid per capita received by country i
and year t. Xit is a vector of control variables, in particular per capita GDP. Unobserved
country effects and period-specific effects are captured by θi and τt. Finally, uit denotes
a residual.
An ideal measure of accountability is difficult to obtain, and detailed data on invest-
ments in disaster prevention and infrastructure investment is not available for a large set
of counties. Therefore, we use an indicator for the quality of governance, the Worldwide
Governance Indicators (WGI) provided by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007),
in order to capture political accountability.16 This WGI indicator is comparatively
detailed and we employ the ”Voice and Accountability” dimension in our study as it
fits best to the concept of accountability as discussed in the theoretical analysis. The
”Voice and Accountability” dimension measures issues like government corruption, the
freedom of expression, and a free media. In order to proxy the support by international
donors in case of shocks, we use official development aid disbursements per capita. In
a sense, our empirical study is more general than the above theoretical analysis which
restricted attention to foreign emergency aid. The control variables account for the
possibility that changes in fundamental economic and social variables like total pop-
ulation and per capita income influence our results. For example, it might be that a
16Knack (2001) also use a qualitative measure of the quality of governance, namely the International
Country Risk Guide
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country experiences an increase in income during the time period considered, e.g. due
to the discovery of natural resources, changes of the terms of trades etc., which triggers
a reduction in foreign aid.
The coefficient of interest in our structural equation is α which captures the impact
of foreign aid payments on political accountability. The identification of α is far from
being trivial. A regression of a measure of governance quality on the amount of de-
velopment aid and standard control variables is likely to suffer from an endogeneity
problem. Historical and social characteristics of a country might jointly determine
both measures. Equally, bad governance might lead to more need and hence higher aid
payments. One possibility to overcome these endogeneity problems is to find an ap-
propriate instrument. The instruments discussed in the literature are on the one hand
proxies for need like infant mortality and GDP per capita as well as social and political
variables like indicators for former colonies or measures of the donors’ interests. Knack
(2001), for example, uses a combination of these variables and finds that evidence that
higher foreign aid levels indeed impair the quality of governance as measured by the
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Yet, the economic variables used in this
and other studies are likely prone to the endogeneity issues discussed above. GDP per
capita determines both the quality of governance and need, respectively aid flows at
the same time and the same holds true for infant mortality. A country might suffer
from high infant mortality exactly because the government is corrupt and incompe-
tent. Therefore, we try to come up with an alternative instrument, namely voting in
the UN General Assembly, which should be independent of these economic variables.
We test also whether using this instrument yields different results than the standard
instrument infant mortality.
Our identification strategy exploits the fact that the pattern of foreign aid giving
is partly determined by strategic considerations. International donor organizations
provide foreign aid for different reasons. Either donor are altruistic and intend to
help the vulnerable citizens in developing countries or donors use foreign aid in order
to foster their own strategic goals.17 Recent studies show that strategic concerns are
an important determinant of foreign aid flows. Kuziemko and Werker (2006), for
example, study whether the ten temporary members of the UN Security Council are
more likely to obtain US foreign aid than other countries during their two-year term.
Their findings indicate that a country receives 59 percent more aid from the United
States and 8 percent more aid from the UN when it rotates onto the council. According
17An explicit formulation of donor’s preferences can be found in Knack and Rahman (2007).
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to these authors, this pattern can be explained by the temporary members trading their
votes for the payment of foreign aid.18 Since the variation in foreign aid which is due to
strategic considerations is determined by exogenous factors like the present geo-political
situation or historical cleavages, it might be reasonable to exploit this variation in order
to obtain an estimate of the impact of foreign aid on political accountability in recipient
countries.
We try to exploit the voting behavior of recipient countries in the UN General Assembly
as an instrument for foreign aid. Specifically, our measure is the percentage of votes
in accordance with the United States as published by the Bureau of International
Organization Affairs at the US Department of State. This variable should be able to
explain changes in the level of aid a country receives from the United States. The
underlying idea is that the United States rewards countries for sharing its political
position in the UN General Assembly by increasing the amount of foreign aid going to
the allied countries. On the other hand, developing countries might vote in accordance
with the United States in order to raise the aid payments received.
Of course, a valid instrument does not only need to be partially correlated with the
potentially endogenous explanatory variable as argued above and tested in subsection
2.3.3, but also needs to be unrelated to the error term. Since the main determinant
driving the voting behavior are strategic concerns, there is no immediate concern that
this measure is correlated with the accountability of the recipient countries’ govern-
ments. Nevertheless, at least one caveat needs to be taken into account: It is important
that the government of the donor country fosters its own strategic interests without
attention to the quality of governance of the countries it cooperates with. One could
argue that this is warranted in our case due to the long-lasting cooperation of the
United States with countries like Pakistan and Saudi-Arabia out of strategic reasons.
Nevertheless, we restrict attention to countries which were already well established
democracies in 2000 as indicated by the democratization measure of Polity IV.19 This
is also necessary to be in line with our theoretical analysis, but entails the advantage
that it becomes rather unlikely that donor countries refrain from cooperating with a
country in our sample out of a general concern for good governance. The exclusion
of countries with low level of democratization also ensures us against the objection
18Alesina and Dollar (2000) were among the first to provide evidence that strategic considerations
are crucial in determining foreign aid flows. Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland (forthcoming) find evidence
that temporary members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the World
Bank.
19We chose this indicator since it refers to the political institutions of a country.
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that donors might concentrate aid on countries which are already characterized by a
considerable level of quality of governance.
Given our previous discussion, the UN voting pattern should be a better instrument
than most economic variables like infant mortality. Even if infant mortality is partly
determined by exogenous factors like climate and geographic conditions, there is still
enough reason to believe that a considerable partial correlation between political ac-
countability and infant mortality exists. Nevertheless, our first regressions employ
infant mortality as an instrument for development in order to obtain a benchmark. As
it is likely that the corresponding results are prone to bias, we repeat the estimates
based on UN voting as an instrument for foreign aid.
2.3.2 Data
This section gives a brief overview of the main variables employed in the empirical
analysis. We focus on the time period from 1998 to 2004 and consider a set of aid
recipient countries. A detailed summary statistic can be found in Table 2.1.
To stay in line with our theoretical analysis in section 2.2 and to restrict attention to
countries which are comparable with respect to the level of democratization, we exclude
all countries which achieve a value less than 6 points on the corresponding measure in
Polity IV. The accountability of governments is captured by the Worldwide Governance
Indicators (WGI) provided by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007). This survey
covers a wide range of countries and quantifies six dimensions of governance between
1996 and 2006 of which we use the ”Voice and Accountability” measure. This aggregate
entails the advantage that it exhibits enough variation across time and countries to
allow for meaningful estimation results. We normalized the value of the indicator to
obtain positive values ranging from 0.61 to 3 with an average of 2.00. The data on
official development aid stem from the OECD’s International Development Statistics
(IDS) online databases on aid and other resource flows. We use annual flows from
the United States and take both inflation and exchange rate movements into account.
The size of per capita aid flows ranges from 0.01 USD to 23.4 USD with an average of
USD 4.85. As an instrument based on an economic variable we take infant mortality
as provided by the WHO in the World Health Statistics. The data on the voting
patterns in the UN General Assembly are available from the Bureau of International
Organization Affairs at the US Department of State. Finally, we gathered control
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Democratization 7.43 1.23 6 10
World governance indicator 2.00 0.43 0.61 3
Per capita ODA (in dollar) 4.85 5.61 0.011 23.4
Child mortality 70.0 52.7 13.8 229
UN Voting 37.0 15.8 0 77.8
Per capita GDP (1,000’s) 4.10 2.87 0.58 17.0
Total population (100,000’s) 59.2 168 0.44 1066
Sample includes observations for Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius,
Mexico, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sene-
gal, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Uruguay and Venezuela in the years 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003 and 2004 (Nob=150).
Sources: Polity IV (2007), Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007), International Development Statistics (OECD),
World Health Statistics (WHO), Bureau of International Organization affairs at the US Department of State (several
years) and Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006). Democratization refers to the corresponding measure in Polity IV.
Child Mortality refers to under-five mortality rate, i.e. the probability of dying between birth and exactly five years
of age expressed per 1,000 live births. ODA is official development assistance and applies to aid from the members of
Development Assistance Committee of the OECD to developing countries. UN Voting is the voting coincidence with
the United States in the UN General Assembly.
variables for each country from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006). These include
total population and per capita GDP for each country and year. To to account for
changes of the price level, we use deflated income data.
2.3.3 Results
To test the quality of the instruments discussed above, we regress the governance
quality indicator WGI on a measure of the importance of development aid as displayed
in equation (18). In the first series of regressions US aid is instrumented by infant
mortality as a measure for need, whereas UN voting patterns is used in the second
series of regressions. The estimation is conducted using a panel data set for 36 countries
with observations between 1998 and 2004 listed in Table 2.1. We estimate robust
standard errors clustered by country thereby allowing for arbitrary country-specific
serial correlation.
The first three columns of Table 2.2 display the specification where we instrument
foreign aid by infant mortality. Column presents a baseline estimation without year
effect and control variables, column (2) adds year effects and column (3) per capita
GDP and total population as control variables. As all three specifications indicate,
there is an impact of foreign aid on the quality of governance which is, however, only
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Table 2.2: Impact of foreign aid on political accountability, instrumental variable esti-
mations with infant mortality or UN voting
Dep. variable: Worldwide Governance Indicator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Per capita ODA -.075 ? -.092 ? -0.097 ? -.042 ? -.038 ? -0.050 ??
(0.042) (0.054) (0.053) (0.023) (0.020) (0.024)
Per capita GDP - - 0.046 - - 0.10
(0.14) (0.089)
Total population - - -0.0084 - - -0.0015
(0.0018) (0.0016)
Year effects no yes yes no yes yes
Country effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Infant Mortality yes yes yes no no noIV’s:
UN Voting no no no yes yes yes
F -Statistic 1st stage 10.2 7.62 6.74 8.80 13.2 12.4
Sample includes observation for a number of developing countries (see text and 2.1 for details) from 1998 to 2004
(150 observations). Standard errors (robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering on country level) in parentheses.
Significance levels: ?? 5%; ? 10%.
weakly significant. The sign of the effect is negative as expected and as reported
by Knack (2001). The F -Statistic of the first stage regression is around the critical
value 10 in the first specification, but slightly below when adding further controls.
Nevertheless, the point estimate is considerably stable across the different specifications
suggesting that an additional USD per capita aid (0.17 standard deviations) decreases
the quality of governance indicator by roughly 0.9 points which corresponds to 0.21
standard deviations.
The last three columns of Table 2.2 presents the second specification where we use the
voting pattern in the UN General Assembly as an instrument. Analogously, column
(4) presents a baseline estimation without year effect and control variables, column
(5) adds year effects and column (6) per capita GDP and total population as control
variables. Again, we find a negative impact of foreign aid on political accountability
which is significant at the 10% level in columns (4) and (5), and even significant at
the 5 % level in column (6). In the two last columns, the F -Statistic of the first stage
regression is well above 10 indicating that the partial correlation between UN Voting
and US foreign aid is sufficiently strong. The sign remains as before, however, the
strength of the crucial effect declines considerably and is roughly half of the size of
the specifications which employ infant mortality as an instrument. The results based
on UN Voting as an instrument suggest that an additional USD per capita aid (0.17
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Table 2.3: Impact of foreign aid on political accountability, instrumental variable esti-
mations with two instruments
Dep. variable: Worldwide Governance Indicator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Per capita ODA -.048 ?? -.041 ?? -0.054 ? -0.054 ?
(0.023) (0.020) (0.024) (0.024)
Per capita GDP - - 0.11 0.11
(0.090) (0.094)
Total population - - - -0.0015
(0.0016)
Year effects no yes yes yes
Country effects yes yes yes yes
F -Statistic 1st stage 5.84 8.12 6.77 6.79
Hansen test (p-value) 0.51 0.34 0.28 0.33
Sample includes observation for a number of developing countries (see text and 2.1 for details) from 1998 to 2004
(150 observations). Standard errors (robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering on country level) in parentheses.
Instruments for Per capita ODA are UN Voting and Child mortality. Significance levels: ?? 5%; ? 10%.
standard deviations) decreases the quality of governance indicator only by roughly 0.45
points which corresponds to 0.10 standard deviations.
As a final check of the two instruments we present a specification which includes both
instruments at the same time. This allows to check whether both instruments have an
independent explanatory value. Table 2.3 displays the corresponding results. Column
(1) shows the baseline specification, and columns (2) to (4) each add time effects,
per capita GDP and total population as control variables. The result indicate that
a combination of both instruments yields a stronger partial correlation between the
instrument and the endogenous variable than before. Even with two instruments, the
F -statistic of the excluded instrument in the first stage regression remains high. The p-
values for the Hansen test indicate that the overidentification restriction is not rejected
at a reasonable level of significance. The size of the effect is similar as when employing
UN Voting as an instrument.
Our results suggest that both political and economic variables are good instruments
for foreign aid. However, our results equally show that the estimate of the size of
the impact of foreign aid on the quality of governance considerably depends on the
instrument chosen. Moreover, the untestable caveats regarding the instruments as
discussed before - in particular with respect to infant mortality - remain.
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2.4 Conclusion
This paper starts from the idea that foreign emergency aid might affect political ac-
countability in developing countries. We set up a model in which elections induce
the government to invest in disaster prevention and relief infrastructure. Particular to
our model, a part of the electorate is uninformed about the actions of the incumbent
politician and conditions its voting decision on its current economic situation. In the
event of a shock like a natural disaster, the voters’ economic situation deteriorates con-
siderably and the incumbent politician loses the support of the non-informed voters in
the upcoming election. Therefore, the government has an interest in reducing both the
likelihood as well as the impact of disasters by investments in prevention and infras-
tructure. However, as soon as an international donor supports the affected citizens in
case of a disaster the incentives of the government to invest are partly lost since the
donor ensures a certain level of income (and hence a certain level of support for the
incumbent politician) even in case of the shock. Yet, we also find that under certain
conditions, foreign aid might even improve the incentives of the government.
Given the results of our empirical study, we conclude that foreign agency aid payments
entail considerable negative side-effects on the functioning of the political system of
developing countries. As a consequence of the weakened incentive to invest in the
prevention and dealing of disasters, we expect emergency aid to increase the expected
loss associated with disasters. Hence, increasing aid is likely to increase the need for
aid in the future. This effect might even be enforced when the support from foreign
countries also impairs the development of a well-informed electorate. Our finding
demonstrates that the potential harmful side-effects of foreign aid payments on the
political system of developing countries need to be taken into account when setting-up
the donor countries’ policy agenda, particularly, since the quality of governance and
the associated informedness of voters are of utmost importance for the development of
a country.
The most obvious normative implication of our analysis would be to condition support
in case of shocks on investments in disaster prevention and relief infrastructure. Then
the government of the recipient country has an even stronger interest in investing since
the political risk associated with the occurrence of a disaster increases. However, as is
well known from the discussion of conditionality in general, the commitment to such a
strategy is often not credible, last but not least given its altruistic motivation. More-
over, in the case of emergency relief further factors beyond the control of the donor
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countries’ governments like attention gained in the media considerably determine aid
flows as Stro¨mberg and Eisensee (2007) have shown. Finally, it is salient that the ac-
tions of the incumbent needs to be observable and not reversible. In the end, altruistic
donors still face an even more pronounced conflict between securing the well-being of
citizens affected by hardship and stabilizing country’s political system which remains
difficult to resolve. The main implication of our discussion might be the necessity of
additional measures that directly strengthen the accountability of the recipient coun-
try’s government by increasing the share of informed voters like programs to improve
the quality of education or the independence of the media.
Our theoretical analysis can be extended by explicitly modeling the information gath-
ering process. This would allow to check whether foreign emergency aid entails an
additional negative impact on the accountability of the incumbent politician by weak-
ening the incentives of voters to gather information. With respect to the empirical part,
our future aim is to disentangle the impact of foreign aid on political accountability in
detail by testing the remaining predictions of our theoretical analysis.
Chapter 3
Ballot access restrictions and
electoral competition∗
3.1 Introduction
The idea that competition is a salient prerequisite for the efficient functioning of mar-
kets is one of the central insights of economics. Consequently, the literature has thor-
oughly analyzed the ways in which incumbent firms might reduce competition, for
example, by creating entry barriers to deter potential competitors.1 Numerous authors
like Becker (1983, 1985) and Wittman (1989) have argued that political competition
exhibits a similar importance for political markets.2 Recent empirical evidence also
indicates that political competition is crucial for mitigating agency problems that are
prevalent in politics. Besley, Persson, and Sturm (2006), for example, provide evi-
dence suggesting that a considerable part of economic growth in the US South can
be explained by variation in political competition. According to their interpretation,
political competition improves the quality of candidates thereby fostering economic
growth.
Our investigation in Chapter 3 starts from the idea that similar to incumbent firms
in oligopolistic markets, incumbent political parties might reduce the effective degree
of competition by deterring other parties from participating in elections. In spite of
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Johannes Rincke, LMU Munich.
1For a discussion of the literature on barriers to entry see Tirole (1988).
2Stigler (1972) provides a more general discussion of the analogies between market competition
and political competition.
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a number of possible ways in which the parties in power might hinder potential con-
testants, the empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of restrictions to political
competition is still very limited. To shed light on this issue, we estimate the effect of
ballot access requirements on the degree of electoral competition in US House elections
as measured by the number of minor party and independent candidates. Since the
stringency of ballot access regulations cannot be treated as being exogenous to candi-
dates’ entry decisions, we exploit a natural experiment to identify the effectiveness of
ballot access restrictions. Our results suggest that ballot access regulations as used by
most states in the US significantly reduce electoral competition.
Ballot access laws specify the conditions potential candidates need to fulfill in order to
be listed on the ballot. In the United States, these restrictions greatly differ between
major and minor parties. For major party candidates, the most common route to
gain access to the ballot is a primary election. Minor parties and independent candi-
dates, however, commonly need to file a petition signed by a certain number of eligible
voters. These number of signatures required vary considerably both in absolute and
relative terms. For example, in 1964 a candidate in Arkansas did not have to show
any signatures to be listed on the ballot, whereas a candidate in Ohio had to present
around 465,000 signatures which corresponded to 4.6 % of the total population. As a
consequence, these petition requirements can potentially be designed by the (major)
parties in power in a way that serves their interests and deters competition from minor
political parties and independent candidates. At first glance restricting access to the
ballot appears to be unnecessary in US politics since the majoritarian voting system
promotes the existence of two dominating political parties as Duverger (1964) pointed
out. Nevertheless, third party as well as independent candidates frequently appear on
the ballot in state as well as federal elections. During the period considered in our
analysis (1952 to 1984), around 17.2% of the races in US House elections saw three
candidates, and an additional 8.7% had four or more candidates.
When measuring the effectiveness of ballot access rules, it needs to be taken into ac-
count that the state laws specifying the requirements for minor party and independent
candidates are subject to changes by the state legislatures. Moreover, with the state
legislatures being dominated by the two major parties, it is likely that the design of the
respective state laws reflects the major parties’ self-interest in limiting competition by
minor parties and independent candidates. Consequently, a strong demand for partic-
ipation in elections by potential third party and independent candidates might trigger
more restrictive ballot access requirements. Of course, if ballot access restrictions are
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effective in reducing the number of third party candidates, we will observe low levels
of competition once these restrictions are in place. In contrast, if the established par-
ties do not face any competition from candidates of other parties, there is no need to
implement particularly restrictive ballot access rules. In such a situation, the strin-
gency of ballot access laws is determined endogenously. Hence, a simple regression of
the degree of electoral competition on the stringency of ballot access requirements is
generally prone to bias. In our example, we would observe low levels of competition
everywhere, but some states with more and others with less restrictive laws. We may
then falsely conclude that ballot access requirements do not affect the degree of polit-
ical competition. By recognizing that ballot access regulations cannot, in general, be
treated as being exogenous to candidates’ entry decisions, our study relates to recent
work on endogenous political institutions by Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi (2004) and
Trebbi, Aghion, and Alesina (2007).3
To overcome the endogeneity problem, this study exploits variation in ballot access
rules from a natural experiment. In particular, we make use of the US Supreme
Court’s 1968 decision in Williams v. Rhodes which struck down the highly stringent
ballot access law the State of Ohio had enacted in 1951. The resulting sharp decrease
in Ohio’s signature requirements provides us with variation in ballot access that comes
from an arguably exogenous source. Exploiting this exogenous variation allows us to
identify the impact of ballot access restrictions on the entry decisions of third party
and independent candidates. We estimate the effectiveness of petition requirements
as a measure of the stringency of ballot access with data for US House elections from
1952 to 1984. Using electoral districts in other states with stable ballot access reg-
ulations as a control group, we show by means of difference-in-difference estimations
that the Supreme Court decision of 1968 resulted in a significant increase in electoral
competition. In particular, we find that the number of minor party candidates rose by
roughly 0.35 (in comparison to the control group) due to the forced liberalization of
Ohio’s regulations which is considerable given Ohios’s long-term average of 0.22. The
magnitude of our estimates can be interpreted quite generally. Between 1951 and 1968
the petition requirements for third party and independent candidates in Ohio were
practically insurmountable. Due to the Supreme Court decision, Ohio had to reduce
its signature requirements to a level comparable to the moderate regulations existent in
most other states. Thus, our difference-in-difference estimations quantify the potential
increase in electoral competition if ballot access restrictions were lowered to moderate
3This idea will be further elaborated in Chapter 4.
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levels in the remaining states which practically exclude minor party candidates until
today.4
Our work is related to a number of earlier contributions. Abramson and Aldrich
(1995) and Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus (1996), for example, study the relevance
of third party and independent candidates in the history of US presidential elections.
Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) discuss the determinants of the number of parties in
general and explain it as an outcome of the interaction between the electoral system and
the heterogeneity of the society. One of the first contributions discussing entry barriers
in politics and the role of rewards of office in fostering electoral competition is provided
by Tullock (1965). Glenn and Choi (2006) show that congressional legislators tend to
vote more in line with their own preferences rather than those of their constituency
when barriers to competition are raised. Moreover, there are a few empirical studies
analyzing the effectiveness of ballot access laws in deterring minor party candidates.
Examining congressional elections from 1984 to 1990, Ansolabehere and Gerber (1996)
find that higher filing fees increase the frequency of uncontested elections and decrease
the frequency of retirements. In the same vein, Stratmann (2005) examines the effect
of filing fees and signature requirements on the number of candidates in US lower house
elections at the state level in 1998 and 2000. His findings suggest that higher filing
fees reduce both the number of major party and minor party candidates. In contrast
to Ansolabehere and Gerber (1996) and Stratmann (2005), who do not discuss the
problem of endogenous determination of ballot access restrictions and thus rely on the
assumption that ballot access is exogenously given, we explicitly address the relevant
state laws as being endogenous to the degree of electoral competition. The importance
of taking into account the potentially endogenous nature of political institutions is
discussed in Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi (2004) and Trebbi, Aghion, and Alesina
(2007). In Chapter 4, we explicitly demonstrate that between 1946 and 1976 state
ballot access laws in the United States have been systematically tightened in response
to stronger political competition.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides the historical
background of Ohio’s ballot access laws. The empirical approach and the data are
discussed in Section 3.3. Thereafter, Section 3.4 presents our results, and Section 3.5
concludes.
4Georgia, for instance, still requires minor party congressional candidates to file petitions, sep-
arately for each congressional district, signed by 5% of registered voters eligible to vote in the last
election. In order to place its candidates on the ballot in all Georgia districts, a new party would thus
have to collect almost 200,000 signatures.
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3.2 The history of ballot access in Ohio
The establishment of election rules was left to the states in the US Constitution of
1789 since the framers could not agree on a single election law for the new federal
government.5 Access to the ballot remained entirely unregulated during much of the
19th century, and the candidates themselves were allowed to print and distribute pa-
per ballots. As these practices resulted in polling irregularities and discouraged in-
dependent candidates due to the immense costs of providing their own ballots, the
state governments in the 1890s gradually adopted the Australian ballot, prescribing
that ballots were to be printed and distributed by the state government (Argersinger,
1980). Consequently, an official nomination procedure for potential candidates had to
be established. These ballot access requirements became increasingly more complex
and more stringent in the course of the 20th century. Since ballot access requirements
are set by the state legislators, the demands vary considerably both in absolute and
relative terms.
The State of Ohio introduced a particularly restrictive ballot access law in 1951. In-
terestingly, the circumstances of its introduction seem to substantiate the notion that
the stringency of entry barriers to political markets can, in general, not be regarded as
exogenously given. Before 1951, Ohio required a third party candidate to collect the
signatures of only 1% of the registered voters, and third party candidates frequently
appeared on the ballot, both in federal and in state elections. In the 1948 presidential
election, Henry Wallace from the Progressive Party polled 1.3% of the votes, leaving
the Republican candidate Harry Truman a margin of only about 7,000 votes to win
the state against the Democratic candidate Thomas Dewey.
To rule out the possibility that third party candidates would prevent a clear victory
by one of the major parties, the Ohio legislature adopted a new ballot access law
in 1951 which practically excluded any third party candidates (Bott, 1990). Ohio
demanded the submission of a petition signed by 15% of the voters participating in
the last gubernatorial election for a party to be recognized officially, and one signed
by 7% of the voters for an independent candidate to qualify for a statewide election;
independent presidential candidates were not permitted. As a consequence, only the
two major parties, which had to satisfy less strict requirements, competed in Ohio’s
political arena in the following years.
5See Bott (1990) for a brief history of ballot access in the United States.
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Unsatisfied with their situation, several minor parties challenged the Ohio ballot access
laws by appealing to the US Supreme Court. In October 1968 the Supreme Court ruled
in Williams v. Rhodes that Ohio’s regulations violated the 1st and 14th Amendments
of the Constitution. In the Williams opinion, Justice Black observed that ’[t]he state
of Ohio in a series of election laws has made it virtually impossible for a new political
party, even though it has hundreds of thousands of members, to be placed on the state
ballot [...]’.6
Forced to reduce the barriers to entry for non-major party candidates, in October 1969
the Ohio legislature decided to lower the number of signature required for new parties
to 7% and for independent candidates to 4% of the last gubernatorial vote. Yet even
this softened regulation was declared unconstitutional by a three-judge US District
Court in July 1970. Hence, the Ohio legislature took action again and adopted a new
law (effective since March 1972) which reduced the requirements to 5,000 signatures
for an office voted on statewide (including President) and 1% of the last gubernatorial
vote in the respective district for congressional elections.
3.3 Estimation approach and data
The main purpose of our paper is to provide evidence of the effect of ballot access
restrictions on electoral competition. As mentioned in the introduction, the identifica-
tion of this effect is complicated by the apparent endogeneity of any regulation defining
barriers to the entry of new political parties. We present a straightforward approach
to solve the identification problem which exploits the Supreme Court decision of 1968
and the resulting significant reduction of ballot access requirements in Ohio as a nat-
ural experiment. To qualify as a natural experiment the units of observation need
to be affected by a sharp and unexpected change in some key variable of interest (in
our case, the restrictiveness of petition requirements for minor party and independent
candidates). It is undisputable that the change in Ohio’s ballot access laws resulting
from the ruling in Williams v. Rhodes qualifies as such an event. The state moved from
being by far the most restrictive state in terms of petition requirements to a regula-
tion that was very similar to those in most other states. For a number of reasons the
Supreme Court decision in Williams v. Rhodes can also be regarded as an unexpected
event. First of all, when the Supreme Court struck down the law it had already been
6Cited in Bott (1990, p. 176).
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in place for 17 years. Secondly, Williams v. Rhodes was the first ruling against existing
ballot access laws in the history of the Supreme Court. Note furthermore that in Jen-
ness v. Fortson, a case showing remarkable similarities toWilliams v. Rhodes, the Court
upheld the ballot access law of the State of Georgia in 1971.7 Likewise, in a number
of court cases in later years, existing ballot access regulations were confirmed.8 Thus,
the behavior of the Supreme Court was not characterized by a general tendency to rule
against pronouncedly restrictive state ballot access laws. Rather, Williams v. Rhodes
constitutes a unique and unprecedented event.
Our estimation approach aims at comparing electoral competition in congressional dis-
tricts in Ohio between 1952 and 1984 to electoral competition in a control group of
congressional districts in other states. The key point about the control-group districts
is thatWilliams v. Rhodes affected signature requirements only in Ohio and not in other
states. Hence, comparing the change in the number of third party and independent
candidates in districts in Ohio to the change in districts from other states should iden-
tify the true effect of Williams v. Rhodes on electoral competition even in the presence
of changes in political participation common to all states. Technically, we exploit the
Supreme Court decision of 1968 by running difference-in-difference estimations. Our
baseline estimation equation takes the form
#MINORit = α+ βOHIO i × 1970-84t + γOHIO i + τt + eit, (1)
where #MINORit is the total number of minor party and independent candidates that
were listed on the ballot in district i in year t, α is a constant, and OHIO i × 1970-84t
is the interaction effect of a Ohio state dummy and a dummy for years after 1968,
i.e., after the Supreme Court decision on Ohio’s ballot access law.9 Moreover, τt is a
year effect and eit is a residual. The coefficient β captures the differential effect of the
change in Ohio’s ballot access requirements. Note that in some estimations we do not
include year effects, but just a single post-shock indicator for years after 1968.
A straightforward alternative to Equation (1) is to allow for a separate interaction
7Winger (2002) provides a detailed discussion of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Jenness v. Fortson.
8See, e.g., Winger (2002) and Bott (1990).
9We treat the year 1968 as belonging to the pre-shock period because presumably there was too
little time for most potential new candidates to prepare and run a campaign. We present robustness
checks for this assignment later on, suggesting that assigning the year 1968 to the post-shock period
or dropping observations from 1968 does not affect any of our main results.
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effects for each post-shock year,
#MINORit = α+ β70OHIO i × 1970t + β72OHIO i × 1972t + · · ·
+β84OHIO i × 1984t + γOHIO i + τt + eit, (2)
where OHIO i×1970t, . . . ,OHIO i×1984t denote interactions of the Ohio state dummy
and indicators for observations from 1970, . . . , 1984. Equation (2) is more flexible, as
it accounts for different treatment effects across years. We also estimate specifications
including a time trend specific to congressional districts in Ohio to account for possible
changes over time in electoral competition in the state not otherwise included in the
model. This is potentially important as the estimates of the treatment effects might
otherwise pick up an independent state-specific trend, leading to false conclusions re-
garding the effectiveness of petition requirements in preventing electoral competition.10
Regarding the residuals in both estimation equations suggested above, note that while
we would like to account for unobserved congressional district effects, this is not gener-
ally feasible. The reason is that, due to redistricting, the districts change considerably
(at least) every 10 years according to the update of population figures by the decennial
census. For instance, the districts in the 1972 congressional election do not coincide
in general with the districts in the 1968 or 1970 election. We do include, however, a
separate indicator for districts in Ohio. Together with the constant term, this dummy
variable will account for all time-constant characteristics shared by districts in Ohio
as opposed to control group districts. Furthermore, we allow for heteroscedasticity as
well as serial correlation of the residuals by reporting fully robust standard errors in
the tables below.
In our analysis, we compare the congressional districts from Ohio to those from Illinois.
The latter constitute a well-suited control group because Illinois was not affected by
the Supreme Court decision but is very similar to Ohio in many respects. Furthermore,
Illinois did not change its ballot access requirements between 1952 and 1984.11 This is
important, as such changes would interfere with the differential impact of the Supreme
Court decision on Ohio’s congressional districts. Illinois’ election law constantly de-
manded a number of signatures equal to a considerable 5% of the vote in the last
election in the respective district in which a candidate was seeking access to the ballot.
10Details on the specifications are reported in the tables showing the estimation results.
11We checked this by searching over the states’ revised statutes for changes in ballot access laws
for the whole period considered in our analysis.
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Table 3.1: Characteristics of treatment and control group (means)
Variable Year Ohio Illinois
1952 23 25
Number of congressional districts 1968 24 24
1984 21 22
1952 8299 8986
Total population (1,000’s) 1968 10462 10907
1984 10817 11428
1952 5143 5775
Per capita income 1968 7018 7680
1984 8607 9628
1952 0.375 0.361
Educational attainment 1968 0.509 0.501
1984 0.705 0.704
1952 0.708 0.782
Urbanization 1968 0.749 0.827
1984 0.736 0.838
Data sources: Statistical Abstract of the United States (various years). Per capita income is measured in 1980 dollars.
Educational attainment refers to share of total population 25 years and over with a high school diploma or a higher
degree. Urbanization is percentage of urban population as defined by the US Census.
Thus, Illinois and Ohio required similar numbers of petition signatures before 1968. As
Table 3.1 shows, Ohio and Illinois are also very alike in many other respects. First of
all, both comprise a similar number of congressional districts. Ohio has between 21 and
24 districts, while Illinois has 22 to 25. Moreover, both states are demographically and
economically very much alike. During the period we consider, both have almost the
same population, per capita income, educational attainment and level of urbanization.
Finally, Illinois is roughly of the same size and geographically close to Ohio.
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics of the dependent and the key explanatory vari-
ables. The data on election outcomes for US House elections between 1952 and 1984
come from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, ICPSR
(1994). These contain a record for each individual candidate, providing information
on the candidate’s name, party affiliation, and the number of votes received. From the
party code we identified third party and independent candidates. In some rare cases the
party codes are missing. Therefore, we checked the party affiliation of all candidates
with missing party codes by referring to the official congressional election statistics.12
12These statistics are available from the office of the Clerk of the US House of Representatives at
http://clerk.house.gov/member info/electionInfo/index.html.
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max
Number of third party and independent candidates 0.123 0.425 0 4
Ohio 0.488 0.500 0 1
1970-84 0.462 0.499 0 1
Ohio× 1970-84 0.227 0.419 0 1
Sample includes all electoral races for the US House of Representatives from 1952 to 1984 in Ohio and Illinois (799
observations). Sources: ICPSR (1994), the Office of the Clerk of the US House of Representatives, Winger (2006)
and the revised state codes for the respective states and several years. ‘Ohio’ is an indicator for the state of Ohio.
‘Ohio× 1970-84’ is the interaction between ‘Ohio’ and an indicator for years after 1968.
For our analysis we considered only third party and independent candidates that were
actually listed on the ballot. Hence, we eliminated write-in candidates from our dataset
and ignored scattered votes. Moreover, we restrict attention to general elections. The
numbers in Table 3.3 confirm that our sample is almost perfectly balanced between
districts belonging to either treatment and control group, and observations from pre-
as well as post-shock periods.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 The effectiveness of ballot access laws: Ohio vs. Illinois
Before turning to the outcomes of our difference-in-difference estimations, we will first
provide an intuition for our results by a comparison of means of the number of third
party and independent candidates before and after 1968. As Table 3.3 shows, the
average number of third party and independent candidates on the ballot in Ohio jumped
from virtually zero before 1968 to 0.44 on average after 1968. In Illinois, the increase
in the number of third party and independent candidates was much less pronounced.
This difference is illustrated in more detail in Figure 3.1. Between 1952 and 1968, the
number of third party and independent candidates was close to zero in both states.
While Illinois experienced a moderate increase beginning in 1972, the average number
of third party and independent candidates in Ohio quickly soared to more than 0.8 in
1976. This number went down to values around 0.3 in 1978/80 and rose again to a value
somewhat below 0.8 in 1982. In all years beginning with 1970, the number of third party
and independent candidates in Ohio was larger than in Illinois. The numbers in Table
3.3 and the graphs in Figure 3.1 give a first impression of the effectiveness of Ohio’s
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Table 3.3: Average number of congressional candidates per district, Ohio vs. Illinois
1952-1968 1970-1984
Nob Mean S.D. Nob Mean S.D.
OHIO
Overall number of candidates 209 1.99 0.18 181 2.36 0.81
Major party candidates 209 1.98 0.14 181 1.92 0.27
Third party & independent candidates 209 0.01 0.12 181 0.44 0.75
ILLINOIS
Overall number of candidates 221 2.00 0.12 188 2.05 0.31
Major party candidates 221 1.99 0.07 188 1.97 0.16
Third party & independent candidates 221 0.01 0.09 188 0.08 0.29
Sample: Congressional districts of Ohio and Illinois in Congressional election years from 1952 to 1984 (799 observations).
ballot access laws before 1968. The evidence suggests that the Supreme Court decision
had a strong and immediate impact on electoral competition. However, we need a more
technical approach to substantiate the descriptive evidence. In particular, we would like
to check the statistical significance of the effects suggested by the descriptive analysis.
We now turn to the results of our difference-in-difference estimation approach. Table
3.4 displays a first set of results. The dependent variable is the number of third party
and independent candidates. Our units of observation are 799 electoral races for the
US House of Representatives in Ohio and Illinois between 1952 and 1984. Note that for
all regressions we report standard errors that account for clustering on congressional
districts. Since districts boundaries change regularly due to redistricting, we form
district-specific clusters for the periods 1952-1960, 1962-1970, 1972-1980, and 1982-
1984, giving a total number of 186 clusters.
Column 1 shows the results for a baseline specification of our difference-in-difference
model. Besides the interaction term Ohio×1970-84, it accounts only for an Ohio state
effect and an indicator for post-shock periods. The increase in the number of third
party and independent candidates in Ohio (relative to congressional districts in Illinois)
resulting from the Supreme Court decision is estimated to be 0.35 and is significant at
the 1% level. The magnitude of the treatment effect is notable (recall that the average
number of minor party candidates is only 0.12 in our sample).
In Column 2 we replace the indicator for post-shock periods by a full series of year
effects. The results are very close to those obtained in Column 1. In Column 3 we split
the single treatment effect employed in the first two specifications into a full series of
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Figure 3.1: Minor-party and independent candidates, 1952-1984
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Graphs show, separately for Ohio and Illinois, average number of third party and independent candidates per district
in US House elections, 1952-1984.
interaction effects, giving a separate treatment effect for each post-shock year. Column
3 thus gives a much more detailed picture of the effects of the change in ballot access on
the entry of third party and independent candidates. We note that the estimates for all
year-specific treatment effects are positive, with six out of eight estimated coefficients
being statistically different from zero at least at the 10% level. The treatment effect
is strongest in 1976, indicating that in this particular election the reduction in ballot
access requirements is responsible for 0.65 additional congressional candidates in Ohio
relative to districts in Illinois.
As mentioned above, the difference-in-difference approach generally is prone to bias in
the presence of a treatment-group specific trend which is not properly accounted for in
the model. To hedge against such a potential bias, we allow for a time trend specific
to districts in Ohio. As the results reported in Column 4 show, the coefficient of the
trend itself is not statistically different from zero, and the general picture regarding the
treatment effects is unchanged. Note, however, that now seven out of eight year-specific
treatment effects are estimated to be statistically different from zero.
So far we have presented results with observations from the year 1968, i.e., the year of
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Table 3.4: Effectiveness of ballot access laws, difference-in-difference, Ohio vs. Illinois
Dependent variable: Number of third party and independent candidates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ohio 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.021 0.023 0.009 0.038
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.036) (0.040) (0.008) (0.039)
1970-84 0.070 ??? - - - - 0.094 ?? -
(0.023) (0.036)
Time trend - - - -0.003 -0.003 - -0.004
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
Ohio×70-84 0.351 ??? 0.352 ??? - - - 0.317 ??? -
(0.067) (0.068) (0.085)
Ohio×1970 - - 0.119 ? 0.134 ? 0.139 ? - 0.129 ?
(0.070) (0.071) (0.075) (0.069)
Ohio×1972 - - 0.345 ?? 0.364 ?? 0.369 ?? - 0.360 ??
(0.162) (0.163) (0.165) (0.162)
Ohio×1974 - - 0.173 0.195 0.201 - 0.192
(0.194) (0.196) (0.198) (0.195)
Ohio×1976 - - 0.653 ??? 0.678 ??? 0.685 ??? - 0.677 ???
(0.199) (0.201) (0.204) (0.200)
Ohio×1978 - - 0.300 ?? 0.327 ?? 0.335 ?? - -
(0.141) (0.145) (0.150)
Ohio×1980 - - 0.213 0.243 ? 0.252 ? - -
(0.135) (0.141) (0.147)
Ohio×1982 - - 0.620 ??? 0.653 ??? 0.662 ??? - -
(0.207) (0.212) (0.216)
Ohio×1984 - - 0.425 ?? 0.461 ??? 0.471 ?? - -
(0.169) (0.177) (0.183)
Adjusted R2 0.159 0.191 0.206 0.205 0.201 0.148 0.215
Years 1952-84 1952-84 1952-84 1952-84 1952-84a 1960-76 1960-76
Sample size 799 799 799 799 751 427 427
Year effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
aObservations from 1968 omitted. All regressions include a constant. Standard errors (robust to heteroscedasticity
and clustering on districts) in parentheses. ‘Ohio’ is an indicator for districts located in the State of Ohio.‘Time trend’
refers to a time trend for Ohio. ‘70-84’ is an indicator for the post-shock period, 1970-1984. Significance levels: ? 10%;
?? 5%; ??? 1%.
the Supreme Court decision, assigned to the pre-shock period. In order to check the
robustness of our findings with respect to this assignment, we excluded these observa-
tions and re-estimated the model with the full series of year-specific treatment effects
and including the Ohio time trend. The results, displayed in Column 5, are almost
identical to those obtained with observations from 1968 assigned to the pre-shock pe-
riod. We conclude that the assignment of these observations does not critically affect
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our results.
A well-known further criticism of difference-in-difference estimations is that with many
time periods in the sample and significantly serially correlated observations, the ap-
proach may overstate the true effects. To account for this objection, we re-estimated
both the baseline specification (Column 6) and the model with a full series of year
effects, the Ohio time trend and year-specific treatment effects (Column 7) using ob-
servations only from the period 1960-1976. This reduces the number of observations
to 427. Again, our results prove to be highly robust. In particular, the coefficient
estimates of the year-specific treatment effects in Column 7 are very close to their
counterparts in Column 5.
The bottom line from the series of difference-in-difference estimations reported in Table
3.4 is that the preliminary findings from the descriptive analysis are confirmed. In
particular, we note that the strong effect of the Supreme Court decision on electoral
competition is statistically significant and robust to various and substantial changes in
specification.
3.4.2 Robustness: Extended control group
A potential objection to our identification approach might be the low variation in the
number of third party and independent candidates in Illinois. Based on the descriptive
evidence reported in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.1, one could argue that our approach
comes close to comparing the variation in the number of candidates in the treatment
districts to a variable which is constant over time in most districts belonging to the
control group. In that case the difference-in-difference approach could be misleading,
as the variation in electoral competition in Illinois might simply be suppressed by the
very special circumstances of this particular state, namely its highly restrictive ballot
access law. To address this point, we extend our analysis by expanding the control
group by congressional districts from three additional states: Indiana, Kentucky and
New Jersey. We selected these states based on two criteria: Firstly, we can only make
use of districts from states that did not change their ballot access laws during at least
a substantial part of the time period under consideration. Secondly, in order to induce
more substantial variation in electoral competition within the control group, the ballot
access laws of the additional states should be significantly less restrictive than those in
Illinois.
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Table 3.5: Average number of congressional candidates per district, extended control
group including Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky and New Jersey
1952-1968 1970-1984
Nob Mean S.D. Nob Mean S.D.
IL, IN, KY & NJ
Overall number of candidates 518 2.35 0.83 400 2.53 0.99
Major-party candidates 518 1.96 0.17 400 1.98 0.15
Third-party & independent cand’s 518 0.38 0.80 400 0.55 0.98
Sample includes electoral races for the US House of Representatives from Illinois (1952-1984), Indiana (1952-1980),
Kentucky (1952-1976) and New Jersey (1952-1984).
Table 3.5 displays descriptive statistics of electoral competition as measured by the
number of minor party candidates within the extended control group. A quick inspec-
tion reveals that the number of third party and independent candidates now exhibits
substantial variation both before and after 1968. Difference-in-difference estimations
based on the extended sample should therefore provide us with a valid point of refer-
ence for the results discussed above. Note that we cannot employ all observations in
our estimations since Indiana and Kentucky altered their ballot access rules towards
the end of the period considered. We therefore restrict attention to the period from
1952 to 1976.
The results based on the extended sample are reported in Table 3.6. Column 1 again
shows the baseline specification including a full series of state dummies, while Column
2 repeats the estimation with a full series of year effects instead of a single indicator for
post-shock-periods. We obtain highly significant estimates of the treatment effect in
both cases, with slightly lower point estimates compared to the estimations with only
districts from Illinois forming the control group. Following the example of the results
presented in Table 3.4, Column 3 replaces the single treatment effect by year specific
interactions. Again, we find all estimated parameters to be positive, and three out of
four effects are significant at least at the 5% level. Finally, Column 4 demonstrates
that adding a time trend specific to districts in Ohio does nothing to our main results.
We conclude that adding congressional districts from three additional states to ex-
tend the control group and to induce higher variation in electoral competition within
this subsample confirms the results derived from estimations where the control group
comprises only districts from Illinois.
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Table 3.6: Effectiveness of ballot access rules, difference-in-difference, extended control
group including Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky and New Jersey
Dependent variable: Number of third party and independent candidates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ohio -1.21 ??? -1.21 ??? -1.21 ??? -1.24 ???
(0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.138)
Illinois -1.22 ??? -1.22 ??? -1.22 ??? -1.22 ???
(0.106) (0.105) (0.105) (0.106)
Indiana -0.951 ??? -0.952 ??? -0.952 ??? -0.952 ???
(0.120) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118)
Kentucky -1.05 ??? -1.05 ??? -1.05 ??? -1.06 ???
(0.118) (0.116) (0.117) (0.117)
1970-1976 0.071 - - -
(0.063)
Ohio time trend - - - 0.007
(0.013)
Ohio×1970-76 0.318 ??? 0.321 ??? - -
(0.105) (0.102)
Ohio×1970 - - 0.317 ??? 0.284 ???
(0.099) (0.110)
Ohio×1972 - - 0.486 ??? 0.446 ??
(0.177) (0.188)
Ohio×1974 - - 0.058 0.011
(0.217) (0.229)
Ohio×1976 - - 0.421 ?? 0.368
(0.213) (0.231)
Adjusted R2 0.345 0.371 0.372 0.371
Years 1952-76 1952-76 1952-76 1952-76
Nob 1048 1048 1048 1048
Year effects No Yes Yes Yes
All regressions include a constant. Standard errors (robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering on districts) in paren-
theses. ‘Ohio’, ‘Illinois’, ‘Indiana’ and ‘Kentucky’ are indicators for districts located in the respective state. See text for
details regarding the extended control group. ‘1970-76’ is an indicator for post-shock periods, 1970-1976. Significance
levels: ?? 5%; ??? 1%.
3.4.3 Robustness: Placebo-treatment Georgia13
One might still question the effectiveness of ballot access laws since it certainly was
not accidental that citizens of the State of Ohio went to court in order to get access
to elections as political candidates. Partly, the strict ballot laws itself was probably a
13This subsection is not part of the joint work with Johannes Rincke, LMU Munich.
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motivation, however, it might also be that minor political parties and other political
groups were especially active in Ohio at that time. If the potential candidates were
persistent enough to appeal the Supreme Court, they also might have overcome Ohio’s
stringent restrictions in case the court had ruled differently. Accordingly, the observed
differential development of the number of candidates in Ohio in comparison to the con-
trol states used in our study might be at least partly due to the strong political pressure
from minor parties and independents particular to Ohio. Ideally, we should compare
the situation in Ohio after the suspension of its strict ballot access requirements to a
hypothetical situation in which these requirements remained effective.
To counter this objection, we analyze the pattern of electoral competition in Georgia
where a similar attempt of potential candidates to gain access to elections failed in 1971.
Georgia required a minor party or independent candidate to produce a nominating
petition signed by not less than 5% of those eligible to vote at the last election for the
office he was seeking. Since these demands were almost insurmountable, the Socialist
Worker Party filed an action in 1970 asking the Supreme Court to suspend Georgia’s
strict requirements. Winger (2002) shows that the regulation in Georgia was at least as
stringent as in Ohio and argues that the US Supreme Court should have struck down
the ballot access laws of both states equally. Nevertheless, in 1971 the Supreme Court
upheld Georgia’s strict ballot access requirements in Jenness v. Fortson.
To check whether a high level of political activism is sufficient to overcome strict ballot
access rules, we exploit the fact that the Supreme Court decided differently in the
two very similar situations as described above. Instead of using Ohio as the treatment
state, we now compare Georgia to Illinois by means of a difference-in-difference analysis.
Though Georgia is slightly smaller (15 congressional districts), Illinois and Georgia are
quite similar in economic and social terms. Since congressional elections take place
in uneven years, the post-treatment period is unambiguously determined. Apart from
adapting the beginning of the treatment, we keep the same time period as before (1952
to 1984).14 If ballot access rules are really effective, we should observe no increase in
the number of candidates in Georgia after 1971 in comparison to Illinois.
The descriptive statistics of electoral competition as measured by the number of minor
party and independent candidates for Georgia and Illinois are displayed in Table 3.7.
The numbers already indicate that Georgias’s strict ballot access laws even deterred
the presumably politically very active minor party candidates who went to the Supreme
14Without affecting the results substantially, one could also exclude the early years.
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Table 3.7: Average number of congressional candidates per district, Georgia vs. Illinois
1952-1970 1972-1984
Nob Mean S.D. Nob Mean S.D.
GEORGIA
Overall number of candidates 100 1.50 0.67 68 1.63 0.49
Major party candidates 100 1.39 0.51 68 1.63 0.49
Third party & independent candidates 100 0.11 0.40 68 0.00 0.00
ILLINOIS
Overall number of candidates 245 2.00 0.11 164 2.06 0.33
Major party candidates 245 1.99 0.06 164 1.97 0.17
Third party & independent candidates 245 0.01 0.09 164 0.09 0.31
Sample: Congressional districts of Georgia and Illinois in Congressional election years from 1952 to 1984 (577 observa-
tions).
Court. Before 1971, on average only 0.11 minor party candidates participated in Geor-
gia’s congressional elections. After 1971 the situation of these political newcomers does
not seem to have improved since no such candidates could be observed any more.
The intuition provided by the descriptive statistics is confirmed by the results of the
difference-in-difference estimations which compare Georgia and Illinois before and after
1971. The corresponding results are depicted in Table 3.8. The dependent variable is
again the number of third party and independent candidates. However, there were only
577 congressional electoral races in Georgia and Illinois between 1952 and 1984. Col-
umn (1) depicts the baseline specification of our difference-in-difference model which as
before only accounts for a Georgia state effect and an indicator for post-shock periods.
The estimator of the interaction term Georgia×1972-84 reveals that the number of
third party and independent candidates in Georgia even decreased slightly after 1971
compared to the control state. The magnitude of the treatment effect is estimated to
be -0.16 and significant at the 1% level. This result does not change in any significant
way when adding year effects (Column (2)) or a time trend (Column(3)).
The case of Georgia clearly indicates that even politically active third party and inde-
pendent candidates are not able to overcome directly the barriers set by strict ballot
access laws. This result provides further evidence that the considerable deterrent ef-
fect of ballot access laws on third party and independent candidates needs to be taken
seriously.
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Table 3.8: Effectiveness of ballot access rules, difference-in-difference estimations, Geor-
gia vs. Illinois
Dependent variable: Number of third party and independent candidates
(1) (2) (3)
Georgia 0.088 ?? 0.102 ??? 0.117 ??
(0.036) (0.037) (0.047)
1972-84 0.055 - -
(0.022) ??
Georgia time trend - - -0.003
(0.005)
Georgia×1972-84 -0.160 ??? -0.192 ??? -0.170 ??
(0.039) (0.045) (0.067)
Adjusted R2 0.021 0.039 0.037
Years 1952-84 1952-84 1952-84
Sample size 577 577 577
Year effects No Yes Yes
a All regressions include a constant. Standard errors (robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering on districts) in
parentheses. ‘Georgia’ is an indicator for districts located in the State of Georgia. ‘1972-84’ is an indicator for the
post-shock period, 1972-1984. Significance levels: ? 10%; ?? 5%; ??? 1%.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the effect of barriers to entry on electoral competition. In
particular, we provide evidence on the impact of ballot access restrictions on entry
decisions of third party and independent candidates. Building on recent contributions
by Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi (2004) and Trebbi, Aghion, and Alesina (2007) who
claim that political institutions should generally be treated as endogenous, we suggest
an identification approach which explicitly takes the potential endogeneity of ballot
access requirements into account. Our identification strategy exploits exogenous vari-
ation in the stringency of ballot access requirements stemming from the US Supreme
Court decision of 1968 to strike down Ohio’s ballot access law. We exploit the resulting
sharp decrease in the signature requirements for third party and independent candi-
dates as a natural experiment. By means of difference-in-difference estimations using
observations from electoral races in US House elections from 1952 to 1984, we study
the effectiveness of ballot access restrictions.
Our results indicate that ballot access requirements as used in most US states can be
highly effective in reducing the degree of electoral competition faced by major-party
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candidates. Specifically, we find that after the forced abolishment of Ohio’s prohibitive
ballot access law, the number of independent and third party candidates appearing
on its ballot rose by roughly 0.35 (in comparison to the control group). This result
is significant at the 1% level and holds for a number of different specifications, in
particular it is highly robust to changes in the control group.
Given the wide-spread use of ballot access restrictions until today and the salience of
political competition for the accountability of governments, our study suggests taking
seriously the costs of restrictions to the entry of new political candidates in general.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of ballot access restrictions shows that political institu-
tions can potentially be exploited by the parties in power to foster their own interests.
This in turn highlights the necessity to understand political institutions as being sub-
ject to the strategic choice of influential actors such as governments and legislatures in
empirical studies.
Chapter 4
The design of political institutions∗
4.1 Introduction
The political economics literature has traditionally treated political institutions as ex-
ogenous constraints on policymakers. This view has only very recently been challenged
by Trebbi, Aghion, and Alesina (2007) who provide evidence that the choice of elec-
toral rules in US cities varies with the share of minorities in a way that effectively
limits minority representation.1 This finding suggests that political institutions should
properly be understood as being subject to strategic choice of influential actors such as
governments and legislatures which exploit these institutions for their own purposes.
This in turn may have strong effects on the quality of governance and thereby economic
performance as recent research by Besley, Persson, and Sturm (2006) indicates. De-
spite the fact that the design of political institutions by self-interested political elites
has such potentially far-reaching consequences, there is little empirical evidence for
endogenous institutional change.
This chapter explicitly addresses the endogeneity of political institutions by focussing
on the design of rules governing ballot access for third parties and independent candi-
dates in the United States. Using state-level variation in the definition of these rules
between 1946 and 1976, we analyze how the degree of competition in gubernatorial elec-
tions faced by major parties has affected the design of ballot access requirements. To
account for the endogeneity of observed levels of electoral competition, we exploit the
federal Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965 as a source of exogenous state-level variation
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Johannes Rincke, LMU Munich.
1See also Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi (2004).
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in electoral competition. In particular, we find that state policymakers did systemati-
cally tighten state ballot access laws in reaction to increased electoral competition by
new political parties and independent candidates.
As explained in Chapter 3, ballot access laws define the requirements potential candi-
dates need to fulfil in order to take part in general elections in the United Sates. Minor
party and independent candidates are commonly required to file a petition signed by
a certain number of eligible voters.2 In Chapter 3 we have also shown in detail that
these requirements have strong deterrent effects on third party and independent can-
didates. This result is confirmed by other studies: Ansolabehere and Gerber (1996)
find that higher filing fees increase the frequency of uncontested races and decrease the
frequency of retirements in congressional elections. In the same vein, Stratmann (2005)
demonstrates that filing fees deter third party candidates in state level Lower House
elections. As the tightening of ballot access restrictions entails an immediate impact
on the effective level of electoral competition which could be exploited by established
parties, these laws are an appropriate example of a (potentially) endogenous political
institution.
As a first step of the analysis, we set up a simple theoretical model which illustrates
the optimal choice of barriers to entry to the political arena from the point of view
of a self-interested incumbent political party. The incumbent party is assumed to
adjust the barrier to changes in exogenous conditions affecting the effective degree of
electoral competition. The model thus treats the effective degree of competition as an
endogenous variable which depends on exogenous conditions as well as the barrier set
by the incumbent party. In a second step, we investigate whether the design of ballot
access requirements in US states is systematically related to the degree of competition
in gubernatorial elections. This exercise is complicated by the fact that the observable
degree of electoral competition already reflects the deterrent effect of existing ballot
access requirements on potential third party and independent candidates: in states with
few such candidates, the major parties will face low competition even without any ballot
access requirement, while in states with many active political parties a similar level
of effective competition might be the outcome of more restrictive requirements. Naive
estimates relating the stringency of ballot access rules to observed levels of electoral
2Despite the fact that a majoritarian voting system as in the US promotes the existence of two
dominating political parties (Duverger, 1964), third-party as well as independent candidates frequently
appear on ballots in state as well as federal elections. During the period considered here (1946-1976),
46% of the gubernatorial races saw three or more candidates, while 50% had two candidates and
4% were uncontested. In US House elections, the corresponding numbers were 28% (three or more
candidates), 59% (two candidates) and 13% (uncontested).
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competition are therefore likely to be misleading.
Our strategy to solve the endogeneity problem exploits the federal Voting Rights Act
(VRA) of 1965 as a natural experiment. Before the mid-1960s, politics in the southern
states3 was characterized by a quasi-monopoly of the Democratic Party and the prac-
tical disenfranchisement of most black voters. The VRA effectively removed barriers
to the political participation of blacks such as poll taxes and literacy tests and led to a
rapid and significant increase in registration rates among black voters: taking all south-
ern states together, registration among blacks jumped from 35.5% in 1964 to 64.8%
in 1969.4 The increased political participation of black voters had a substantial effect
on the political supply side, i.e. on political parties and potential candidates for public
office: while in all non-southern states the average number of candidates in guberna-
torial elections showed a moderate change from 2.6 in the years immediately before
the VRA (1958-1964) to 2.9 in the period 1966-1972, the respective figure considerably
increased from 2.1 to 2.8 in the southern states.
When exploiting the variation in electoral competition induced by the VRA, we proceed
in two steps. In the first step, we substantiate the claim that the VRA is a source of
exogenous variation in the number of candidates in gubernatorial elections, and that
this variation is strong enough to solve our identification problem. In particular, we
estimate the treatment effect of the VRA on the number of candidates in states with
a substantial black minority by a series of difference-in-difference estimations. The
main finding across various specifications and robustness checks is that the federal
intervention of 1965 indeed had a significant impact on the number of candidates. We
check this result against a number of alternative explanations for the increase in the
number of candidates in southern states. In particular, we show that the significant
increase in electoral competition cannot be explained by the gradual catch up of the
US South in terms of educational attainment, income, and urbanization.
Our main result is established in the second step of the empirical analysis, where we
derive estimates of the impact of electoral competition on the stringency of ballot access
laws in terms of signature requirements for third-party and independent candidates.
To overcome the endogeneity problem, we construct an instrumental variable for the
number of candidates which captures the variation in electoral competition induced by
the VRA. We construct the instrument in such a way that the difference-in-difference
3We use the definition of the Census Bureau and treat as southern states Alabama, Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.
4See Statistical Abstract of the United States (1970, p. 369).
Design of Political Institutions 74
estimations derived in the first step of the analysis can be interpreted as first stage
regressions of our instrumental variable estimations. Based on data for the period 1946-
1976, our findings point to a strong impact of electoral competition on the stringency
of the states’ ballot access laws. On average, an additional candidate on the ballot has
triggered an increase in petition requirements in the order of 7,500 to 10,000 signatures.
Again, we perform several robustness checks to validate our findings. Taken together,
the empirical analysis suggests that the states have systematically tightened their ballot
access laws in reaction to increased levels of electoral competition. Hence, ballot access
regulations provide an example of endogenous political institutions.
Most of the literature on constitutional choice and electoral rules has treated polit-
ical institutions as exogenous constraints on policymakers. For instance, an influen-
tial recent line of thinking comprising, among others, Rodrik (1999) and Persson and
Tabellini (2003) has discussed institutions as predetermined factors driving key eco-
nomic outcomes. Only very recently a positive approach to the choice of political
institutions has been suggested. It seeks to explain why different societies have dif-
ferent political institutions, and tries to figure out the determinants of institutional
change. Alesina and Glaeser (2004), for instance, deal with the strategic choice of elec-
toral rules, focussing on the implications of alternative constitutional choices on the
welfare state. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) explain the extension of voting rights in
western societies as the outcome of strategic choices of political elites to prevent social
unrest. The tradeoff between delegation of power and ex-post control of politicians is
analyzed in Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi (2004). Finally, Trebbi, Aghion, and Alesina
(2007) report evidence that the choice of electoral rules in US cities varies with the
share of minorities in a way that effectively limits minority representation.
The paper is organized as follows. The theoretical model illustrating the behavior of
an incumbent party in setting barriers to entry is presented in Section 4.2. Section 4.3
sheds light on the historical background of our empirical analysis in general and the
VRA in particular. The empirical approach and the data are discussed in Section 4.4.
Section 4.5 presents our results, and Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Setting optimal barriers to entry
This section provides a simple theoretical framework for the following empirical discus-
sion. In particular, the model highlights the role of incumbent political parties which
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choose optimal barriers to prevent the entry of political competitors.
Consider an economy with political parties competing for power. We focus on the
choice of the ‘rules of the game’ by an incumbent political party, in particular, the
setting of a barrier to entry, B. The barrier affects the degree of effective competition,
described by the well-behaved function C according to
C = C(C˜, B), (1)
where C˜ summarizes exogenous conditions that influence C. We call C˜ latent compe-
tition. Using subscripts to indicate partial derivatives, let CC˜ > 0 and CB < 0. In
addition, we assume CBB > 0, meaning that increasing the barrier reduces its marginal
impact on C, and CBC˜ < 0, saying that a given increase in B is more effective the
more candidates are seeking access to elections.
To capture the idea that incumbent parties usually dislike a situation with strong
electoral competition, we define a benefit function V (C) with VC < 0. However, setting
higher barriers to entry comes at a cost, captured by a cost function K(B) withKB > 0
and KBB > 0. In practical terms, one may think of negative effects on the incumbent
party’s general reputation, or of higher political effort needed to implement a more
restrictive rule.5 In total, the incumbent party maximizes the difference between the
benefits and costs of setting B,
V −K = V (C(C˜, B))−K(B). (2)
From the first-order condition, VCCB −KB = 0, we obtain
dB
dC˜
=
VCCBC˜ + VCCCC˜CB
KBB − VCCBB − VCCCBCB . (3)
As long as the second-order condition holds (i.e. the denominator is positive), the
sign of dB
dC˜
is positive unless VCC is strongly positive. In particular,
dB
dC˜
> 0 will
hold if the reduction in utility when competition increases is constant (VCC = 0).
Hence, for a wide range of benefit functions, our model predicts a re-design of rules
defining barriers to entry in a way that an increase in latent competition triggers more
restrictive regulations. Though being likely, the last assumption certainly depends on
5Ballot access laws have been challenged in court several times. In 1968, for instance, the Supreme
Court declared Ohio’s ballot access law unconstitutional, and the state had to reduce the requirements
for third-party and independent candidates considerably.
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the curvature of the incumbent’s utility function. Therefore, we are going to test the
relationship between B and C˜ empirically.
In the empirical part of the paper we test for an endogenous adjustment of B due
to changes in electoral competition C˜, taking the ballot access restrictions of the US
states as an example. This is complicated by the fact that the exogenous conditions
C˜ driving the observed effective degree of electoral competition C are difficult (if not
impossible) to capture. Whereas C can be approximated by the number of candidates
seeking for office, C˜ can only be observed by the political actors themselves. The
incumbent, for example, might know whether a group of voters is unsatisfied with his
policy, or whether there is a popular activist or politician who is likely to run as an
additional candidate (and adjust B accordingly). For us, these details of the political
process are difficult (if not impossible) to capture. Therefore, our approach to estimate
the effect of electoral competition on the stringency of ballot access restrictions rests
on the idea to use a readily observable measure for effective competition (such as the
number of candidates appearing on the ballot) as the key explanatory variable and to
account for the endogeneity of this measure (i.e. the fact that C˜ itself depends on B)
by instrumental variables. Intuitively, the instruments serve as a substitute for latent
competition as the unobservable explanatory variable of interest. Before turning to the
empirical part, however, we briefly review some key historical facts our identification
approach is based upon.
4.3 Historical background
Our identification strategy builds on exogenous variation in state-level electoral compe-
tition that was induced by the abolishment of voting rights regulations in the southern
states in 1965. In the following, we provide a summary of the relevant historical facts.6
Since the 1880s the Democratic Party had established a political quasi-monopoly in
the US South with its representatives often remaining uncontested in elections. This
position was partly built on the effective disenfranchisement of black voters. Among
others, black citizens were refused their political rights by all-white Democratic pri-
maries and so-called ‘Grandfather Clauses’ which limited the right to vote to those
individuals whose grandparents had it before the Civil War. Moreover, political par-
6For more details, see, e.g., Lawson (1976) and Grofman, Niemi, and Handley (1992). Besley,
Persson, and Sturm (2006) provide a related description of the historical background.
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ticipation of blacks was obstructed by poll taxes and literacy tests. Though poll taxes
were comparatively low, they discouraged many poor blacks from casting their vote.
Literacy tests were used in an arbitrary manner to discourage black voters from regis-
tering. As a consequence, only a small fraction of black citizens registered for voting.
In 1960 the average registration rate among blacks in the US South was only 29.1%, in
contrast to 61.1% among white citizens. In some states, the asymmetry in registration
rates was even more pronounced. In Mississippi, for example, in 1960 only 5.2% of the
blacks, but 63.9% of the whites were registered.7
The attempts of the black citizens in the southern states to change their lot were largely
unsuccessful for a long period of time. Only after the landmark decision Brown v. Board
of Education by the Supreme Court in 1954, which struck down racial segregation in
public schools, the black reform movements started to gain momentum. The Civil
Rights Movement culminated ten years later in the 1963 ’March on Washington’ and
Martin Luther King’s ’I have a dream’ speech. As a response to the growing discom-
fort among black citizens, the Johnson administration decided to support the reform
movement by federal legislation, in particular by the Civil Rights Act (CRA) in 1964
and the Voting Rights Act in 1965. But whereas the black reform movement developed
gradually, the cornerstones of the federal civil rights legislation were enacted in a quick
succession of events. In particular, it seems that the actions taken by the Johnson ad-
ministration were largely driven by unforeseen media coverage of a number of singular
events.
One of the unforseen events that triggered legislative activity of the Johnson adminis-
tration was the murder of three civil rights activists in Mississippi on June 21, 1964.
The subsequent public outrage made the Republicans join the Northern Democrats
against the Southern Democrats to pass the CRA which president Johnson immedi-
ately signed into law on July 2, 1964. Among other things, the CRA made voting
restrictions in federal elections illegal, but the existing restrictions at the state level
remained in place. It does not seem that the Johnson administration had any intention
to amend the CRA after the 1964 elections.8 Yet, further events, especially the attack
by state troopers on peaceful demonstrators walking from Selma, Alabama, to the state
capital Montgomery on March 7, 1965, received tremendous media attention and made
president Johnson send a proposal for a strict enforcement of voting rights to Congress
on March 17, 1965. The Senate and the House passed the bill at the beginning of
7For more details on voter registration in the US South between 1960 and 1970, see Statistical
Abstract of the United States (1971, p. 365).
8See also Besley, Persson, and Sturm (2006).
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August. On August 6, 1965, president Johnson signed the VRA into law.
The VRA finally suspended the use of poll taxes and literacy tests by the states.
Moreover, it authorized federal supervision of voter registration in states, or counties,
where such restrictions had been used in the past and where less than 50% of the voting
age population was registered. Accordingly, the implementation of the prescriptions of
the VRA was very strict and highly effective. This stands in contrast to all previous
attempts of federal legislators to abolish the political disenfranchisement of blacks
in the US South. Until 1965 these efforts were largely unsuccessful as the southern
Democrats persistently obstructed any federal initiative addressing the discrimination
of blacks.9 Due to the strict enforcement of the VRA, the registration of black voters
increased substantially, and the political landscape of the US South was quickly and
fundamentally transformed. As a consequence, the quasi-monopoly of the Democratic
Party in the southern states came to an end. Already in 1966, the first Republican
governors in the US South in the 20th century were elected in Arkansas (W. Rockefeller)
and Florida (C.R. Kirk). Until the mid-seventies, Republicans became governors also
in North Carolina (J.E. Holshouser, 1972), South Carolina (J.B. Edwards, 1974), and
Virginia (L. Holton, 1969).
4.4 Empirical approach and data
In this section we discuss our identification strategy regarding the effect of electoral
competition on the stringency of ballot access restrictions. We also briefly review our
data and present summary statistics.
4.4.1 Estimation approach
Our analysis aims at providing evidence of the effect of electoral competition on the
design of ballot access laws in the US The identification of this effect is complicated
by the apparent endogeneity of variables that measure the effective degree of electoral
competition. To overcome this problem, our estimation strategy exploits variation in
electoral competition which was triggered by the VRA and, therefore, is exogenous to
the states’ ballot access regulations. In particular, we make use of the fact that the
9For a detailed account of the long and unsuccessful struggle against voting rights restrictions in
the US South see Lawson (1976).
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VRA considerably increased the overall level of political participation in states with a
relatively high black population share, whereas it left states with relatively few blacks
more or less unaffected.
Before explaining our identification strategy in detail, let us briefly discuss the struc-
tural equation of interest which reads
Bit = αCit +Xitβ + θi + τt + eit, (4)
where Bit measures the stringency of ballot access restrictions in state i in year t, Cit
is the degree of electoral competition, and Xit denotes a vector of state characteristics
that potentially affect the stringency of ballot access requirements. Unobserved state
effects and period-specific effects are captured by θi and τt, while eit denotes a residual.
We use the number of petitions that minor-party and independent candidates need
to submit in order to be placed on the gubernatorial ballot as a measure for B. As
mentioned before, these signature requirements are often substantial and constitute
a significant barrier to entry for third party and independent candidates. In general,
the variation in the petition requirement is substantial, both across states and over
time.10 Note further that other restrictions like filing fees and tight deadlines during the
application process seem to be less important in practice: filing fees for gubernatorial
candidates are of negligible size in the majority of states, and where they are not,
several Supreme Court rulings require that alternative means for gaining ballot access
have to be specified. Similarly, due to a number of court decisions, the leeway to adjust
deadlines that have to be met during the application process (like for filing petitions)
is very limited in practice.
With regard to C, we use either the total number of candidates appearing on the
ballot or the number of third-party and independent candidates. At first glance, the
latter measure seems to be the better choice since it is more closely related to the
stringency of ballot access restrictions for minor-party and independent candidates.
Recall, however, that uncontested gubernatorial races were quite frequent prior to
1965 in the southern states. The significant increase in electoral competition faced by
the southern Democrats in the aftermath of the VRA was to a considerable extent due
to candidates of the Republican Party regularly appearing on gubernatorial ballots.
This in turn might have triggered adjustments of ballot access requirements in general,
10See Bott (1990) for details on the states’ ballot access laws and the following subsection for
descriptive statistics on signature requirements.
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and in particular for minor-party and independent candidates. We therefore use the
total number of candidates as a measure for electoral competition in most estimations
and report results based on the number of third party and independent candidates as
a robustness check.
The prime role of the control variables is to account for a possible effect of key economic
and social-demographic indicators on signature requirements. For instance, more pop-
ulous states might choose higher signature requirements. Similarly, it might be that
the leading parties are more likely to face significant competition in wealthier and
more urbanized states. Therefore, we allow for an independent effect of total state
population, per-capita income, educational attainment as well as urbanization.
The coefficient of interest in our structural equation is α. It captures the extent to
which states re-design their ballot access requirements in response to changes in the
degree of electoral competition. We expect a positive sign of α, indicating that states
tend to make access to the ballot more difficult for third-party and independent can-
didates if major parties face more competition. However, recall from the discussion
of the theoretical model that, because the effective degree of electoral competition al-
ready reflects the impact of B, estimating α from a naive regression is uninformative.
Technically, the dependence of C on B induces correlation between our main explana-
tory variable and the residual, which renders parameter estimates from simple OLS
regressions inconsistent. Our approach to solve the endogeneity problem is to identify
a source of exogenous variation in electoral competition at the state level and to ex-
ploit this variation in order to derive instrumental variables for C. If the exogenous
variation captured by the instruments is sufficiently strong, a two-stage least squares
(2SLS) regression will identify the effect of interest. Intuitively, the instrumental vari-
ables are used as a substitute for C˜, the unobservable exogenous variable of interest in
the theoretical model.
Our choice of instruments exploits the extraordinary impact of the VRA on the po-
litical participation of blacks in the US South. To the extent to which the resulting
increase in black voter participation triggered an increase in electoral competition in
those states which were affected by the federal legislative initiative, the intervention
has the potential to provide us with variation in the number of candidates that is ar-
guably exogenous to the states’ ballot access requirements. A straightforward way to
investigate the differential impact of the abolishment of impediments to black voter
participation is to estimate the impact of the VRA on the number of gubernatorial
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candidates by means of a difference-in-difference approach. In its simplest form, a
corresponding estimation equation looks like
Cit = γBlack × V RAit + X˜itδ + θ˜i + τ˜t + uit, (5)
where Cit again represents the degree of electoral competition, i.e. either the total
number of candidates or just the number of minor-party and independent candidates.
Black × V RA is the interaction between an indicator for states which were affected
by the federal intervention, Black , and a second indicator, VRA, which takes value
zero for all years prior to 1966 and value one for the years starting from 1966 (the
post-shock periods). X˜it is a vector of control variables, where the tilde indicates that
the vector is allowed to differ from the corresponding vector Xit in Equation (4). As
in our main estimation, we also include state effects, θ˜i, and period effects common to
all states, τ˜t.
The purpose of the difference-in-difference estimations is to check whether (and to
what extent) the VRA increased electoral competition in the subset of affected states.
We will therefore focus on the coefficient of the interaction term, γ, which captures
the differential impact of the federal intervention. With respect to the definition of
Black , recall that most of the southern states were immediately affected by the VRA
because they were forced to abolish impediments to black voter participation like poll
taxes and literacy tests.11 Note, however, that even in states that did use neither poll
taxes nor literacy tests at the time of the VRA, the political participation of blacks
rose considerably. Florida, for instance, had abolished poll taxes already in 1937 and
did not use formal literacy tests. Notwithstanding, the registration rate of blacks
increased from 39.4% in 1960 to 55.3% in 1970, while the registration rate among
whites decreased from 69.3% to 65.5%.12 In general, the available data on registration
and voting behavior between 1960 and 1970 suggest that the VRA had substantial
effects on the political participation of blacks in all states. To account for this, we use
the size of the black minority in order to assign states to treatment and control group
for the difference-in-difference estimations. In particular, we define all states with more
than 10% black population in 1960 as Black.13
11These were Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Virginia and Texas.
12Statistical Abstract of the United States (1971, p. 365).
13All our results are robust to moderate changes of this threshold. In particular, we checked whether
the inclusion of states which were close to the 10%-threshold in 1960 into the treatment group (such
as Kentucky with 7.1% blacks, Pennsylvania (7.5%), Missouri (9.0%), Michigan (9.2%), and Illinois
(10.3%)) affects the results of the difference-in-difference as well as the 2SLS estimations.
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Equation (5) suggests a straightforward way to derive instruments for the number of
candidates in the main structural equation (4). The difference-in-difference estimation
identifies the effect of increased voter participation induced by the VRA on electoral
competition. If the states in the treatment group (those strongly affected by the
federal intervention) experienced a significant increase in electoral competition, we
should find positive and statistically significant estimates for γ, indicating a significant
partial correlation between the interaction term and the degree of electoral competition.
Thus, if γ is found to be statistically different from zero, our difference-in-difference
estimation procedure would suggest to use Black × V RA as an instrument for the
endogenous electoral competition measure C in our main structural equation.
Of course, to obtain valid instruments for the degree of electoral competition, we do
not only need to establish that the instruments are correlated with the endogenous
explanatory variable, but also that the instruments are truly exogenous to the strin-
gency of the states’ ballot access provisions. As we have argued in the previous section,
both the CRA and the VRA were imposed on the southern states by the federal gov-
ernment. Moreover, we have pointed out that the enactment and implementation of
both acts was an unprecedented event. In particular, it seems to be highly unlikely
that state policymakers did anticipate the federal intervention they experienced in the
course of the 1964/65 events. Note furthermore that neither the CRA nor the VRA
did address the use of ballot access requirements by the states. It therefore seems to
be justified to treat the federal legislative intervention of 1964/65 as exogenous to the
design of ballot access rules. Moreover, we account for the fact that ballot access laws
in some states specify an absolute number of signatures, while in others the require-
ment is given as a percentage of registered voters or votes cast in the preceding general
election. In states with a relative definition, an increase in turnout (or the number of
registered voters, depending on the specification of the corresponding state law) will
automatically increase the number of petitions required to get access to the ballot in
the next election. To ensure that our instrument can still be validly excluded from
the main estimation equation, we have to account for the direct effect of participation
by appropriate explanatory variables. Therefore, we construct two indicator variables,
one for states with a relative definition of the signature requirement and one for states
with an absolute definition. In our main estimation, we include the interactions of both
indicators with the number of votes cast in the preceding election as additional control
variables. Finally, we also include the indicator for states with a relative definition.
We complete the description of the empirical approach by discussing the choice of
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the control variables in the difference-in-difference regressions which are essentially the
same as in the 2SLS estimations. In particular, we allow for an independent effect of
per capita income, educational attainment and urbanization in order to account for the
possibility that an increase in the number of candidates for governor in southern states
might be due to the economic catching-up of the US South. For example, higher levels
of educational attainment might induce more citizens to participate in politics, thereby
increasing the number of candidates. Furthermore, we account for the possibility that
more populous states may see more candidates by including state population as an
additional regressor.
4.4.2 Data
The cross-sectional dimension of our sample is given by the population of contiguous
US states. Regarding the time dimension, we make use of the gubernatorial election
years between 1946 and 1976. The group of states which are assumed to having expe-
rienced a significant shock in the overall level of political participation in 1964/65 is
defined based on the population share of blacks in 1960, requiring a share of at least 10
percent. This definition gives a set of 14 states for which the indicator Black is set to
one, consisting of Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana,
Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia.
Note that this list includes all southern states according to the definition of the Census
Bureau.
Our measures of electoral competition are based on gubernatorial election outcomes
as reported in ICPSR (1994). The data provide information on each individual candi-
date. Yet, especially for the early years, the assignment of party codes to individual
candidates is imprecise in some cases. This is due to the fact that for some states the
sources ICPSR (1994) is based on did not properly distinguish between minor-party
candidates and write-in candidates. In all such cases, we checked and corrected the
party codes by comparing the respective records in the ICPSR data to the information
on individual candidates in various editions of the handbook on US election statistics
by R.M. Scammon.
The main source for the preparation of data on signature requirements for third-party
and independent candidates in gubernatorial elections were hard copies of the states’
statutes for the whole period 1946-1976. In general, we define our measure of the strin-
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gency of ballot access restrictions for minor-party and independent candidates as the
number of signatures needed on a petition. In states where the election law specified
requirements that differed between minor party and independent candidates, we chose
the lower number. In case the number of petition was defined as a percentage of either
the number of votes cast in the last general election or the number of registered voters,
we calculated the implied absolute number of signatures using data on the number
of votes cast from ICPSR (1994) and data on the number of registered voters from
the Statistical Abstract of the United States (various editions). When the number of
registered voters was unavailable for the respective election, we linearly interpolated
using the numbers from the next available years. In a second step, we cross-checked the
numbers obtained from the states’ statutes, using the information on petition require-
ments in presidential elections in Winger (2006), Appendix F (in most states, ballot
access requirements for presidential and gubernatorial elections are the same) as well
as Bott (1990). In some cases, we were not able to figure out the precise signature
requirement for gubernatorial elections, mostly because the respective state laws spec-
ified alternative ways to get on the ballot rendering it difficult to determine the exact
signature requirement.14 Note in particular that we had to exclude the following states
from the analysis altogether: New York, Vermont, Ohio, Washington, New Jersey, and
Wisconsin. For New Jersey, Washington and Wisconsin we had difficulties in deriving
a consistent measure for the signature requirement because the respective state laws
allow for various alternative means to get ballot access. In New York and Vermont, in-
dividual candidates in gubernatorial elections often represent multiple political parties.
Our measure for electoral competition for these states is thus not comparable to the
remaining states. Finally, Ohio’s ballot access law was struck down by the Supreme
Court in 1968 as being overly restrictive. Since our approach aims at identifying en-
dogenous adjustments of ballot access rules, we do not want to make use of variation
which is known to be driven by exogenous forces.
The data on state characteristics that serve as control variables come from the Bureau
of the Census. They include total state population, per capita income (deflated to
1960 dollars), educational attainment (percentage of total population 25 years and
over with a high school diploma or a higher degree), and urbanization (percentage of
urban population as defined by the Census Bureau).
Table 4.1 entails summary statistics for petition requirements as specified in the re-
14For instance, some state laws offer minor parties the opportunity to hold a party convention with
a certain minimum number of attendees that can nominate a candidate whose name will then appear
on the ballot.
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Table 4.1: Petition requirements for minor-party and independent cand’s, 1946-1976
Period Nob Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
1946-1976 410 8476 16034 0 103208
1946-1956 170 5477 11388 0 57306
1958-1966 135 9254 16987 0 74223
1968-1976 105 12329 19951 0 103208
Samples comprise states in gubernatorial election years in the respective period. Sources: Revised State Codes (various
years) and Winger (2006).
Table 4.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Total # of candidates 2.72 1.20 1 9
# of minor-party & independent cand’s 0.749 1.15 0 7
Vote castt−1 (1000’s) 905 1067 40.7 6510
Signature requirement relative 0.368 0.483 0 1
Black 0.298 0.458 0 1
VRA 0.326 0.469 0 1
Black×VRA 0.110 0.313 0 1
Total population (1000’s) 3111 3215 143 21173
Per capita income (in dollars of 1960) 6228 1767 2701 11360
Educational attainment 42.7 11.0 18.9 74.9
Sample comprises states in gubernatorial election years, 1946-1976 (Nob=410). Sources: ICPSR (1994) and Statistical
Abstract of the United States (various years). Total # of candidates, # of minor-party and independent candidates
and vote cast for general elections only. ‘Black’ is an indicator for states with a population share of blacks higher
than 10% in 1960. VRA is an indicator for post-VRA periods, i.e. 1966-1976. Educational attainment is share of total
population 25 years and over with a high school diploma or a higher degree. Urbanization is share of urban population
as defined by the Census Bureau.
spective state election laws. We note that there is substantial variation in signature
requirements both across states and across time. While in the period 1946-1956 the
average number of signatures required to put a non-major party candidate on a gu-
bernatorial ballot was about 5,500, that number more than doubled to reach more
than 12,000 in the period 1968-1976. In addition, the standard variation increased
considerably.
Table 4.2 shows summary statistics for the explanatory variables in our main struc-
tural equation. Our key explanatory variables are shown in the first two rows. Note
in particular that minor-party and independent candidates appear on gubernatorial
ballots quite frequently.
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Table 4.3: Effect of VRA on electoral competition, difference-in-difference estimations
Dependent variable: Number of candidates in gubernatorial elections,
all parties minor parties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Black×VRA 0.591 ?? 0.583 ?? 0.597 ?? 0.518 ?? 0.538 ??
(0.235) (0.219) (0.241) (0.216) (0.233)
VRA 0.312 ?? - - - -
(0.117)
Population - - 0.00007 ?? - 0.00006 ?
(0.00003) (0.00003)
Per-capita income - - -0.0002 - -0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Educational attainment - - 0.059 - 0.043
(0.080) (0.074)
Urbanization - - 0.014 - 0.011
(0.016) (0.016)
Year effects no yes yes yes yes
State effects yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.49 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.55
Sample includes gubernatorial elections from 1946 to 1976 (429 observations), see text for details. Standard errors
(robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation) in parentheses. ‘Black’ is an indicator for states with a black
population share exceeding 10% in 1960. ‘VRA’ is an indicator for elections taking place after the VRA, i.e. 1966-1976.
Significance levels: ?? 5%; ? 10%.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 The effect of the VRA on electoral competition
Before we turn to our main results, we will first discuss the results of the difference-in-
difference estimations regarding the impact of the VRA on electoral competition. The
first set of results is displayed in Table 4.3. Column (1) shows the treatment effect
for a baseline specification that accounts only for state effects and the indicator for
post-shock years, V RA, as additional explanatory variables. Relative to the states in
the control group, the effect of the VRA on the number of candidates in the states
with a significant black minority is estimated to be about 0.6. Column (2) depicts the
results if we account for a full set of year effects instead of V RA. The coefficient of
the treatment effect is virtually unchanged and still significant at the 5% level. To
account for an independent effect of state characteristics which might be related to the
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number of candidates in gubernatorial elections, Column (3) reports a specification
that includes total state population, per-capita income, educational attainment, and
urbanization as additional explanatory variables. Among the control variables, only
population proves to be significant. The coefficient indicates that if the population
grows by 1 million, the number of candidates increases by 0.07. More importantly, the
estimated effect of the VRA on the number of candidates is unaffected by the inclusion
of the additional control variables and still significant at the 5% level.
Further evidence for the effect of the VRA on electoral competition is provided in
Columns (4) and (5). Here, we have defined the dependent variable as the number of
minor-party and independent candidates as opposed to the total number of candidates
in the previous regressions. As expected, switching to this narrower definition does
not have any sweeping effect on our estimates. The somewhat smaller point estimates
for the treatment effect just reflect that part of the increase in electoral competition
in the southern states after the VRA was due to candidates of the Republican Party
now regularly appearing on gubernatorial ballots. To summarize, Table 4.3 confirms a
strong effect of the VRA on the number of candidates in gubernatorial elections.
4.5.2 The effect of electoral competition on the design of
ballot access laws
Let us now turn to the impact of electoral competition on the stringency of the states’
ballot access requirements, i.e. the number of signatures required for minor-party and
independent candidates to be placed on the ballot in gubernatorial elections. As dis-
cussed in the previous section, we identify this competition effect by means of 2SLS
estimations accounting for unobserved heterogeneity at the state level. Drawing on the
strong partial correlation between the interaction term Black×V RA and the number of
candidates identified by the series of difference-in-difference estimations shown above,
we use Black × V RA as an instrument for electoral competition.
As before, Table 4.4 reports estimated coefficients along with standard errors which
are robust to both heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. While we use the same
set of states as in the difference-in-difference estimations shown above, we now have
only 410 observations (compared to 429 before). The reason is missing information
on signature requirements for some state/year cells as mentioned before. Column (1)
reports a baseline specification of our structural equation that accounts for the impact
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Table 4.4: Effect of electoral competition on stringency of signature requirements,
instrumental variable estimations
Dep. variable: Signature requirement for minor-party and independent candidates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total number of cand’s 9316 ?? 8774 ?? 9408 ?? 9812 ?? 9343 ??
(4327) (4081) (4369) (4688) (4468)
Vote castt−1× signature 13.9 ??? 13.4 ??? 14.1 ??? 14.4 ??? 14.0 ???
requirement relative (5.29) (4.91) (5.39) (5.49) (5.23)
Vote castt−1×signature -0.401 -0.104 -0.405 -0.160 0.067
requirement absolute (5.93) (5.80) (5.95) (6.00) (5.86)
Signature requirement 22093 ?? 22142 ?? 22115 ?? 22183 ?? 22245 ??
relative (9074) (9013) (9079) (9167) (9090)
Population 0.227 -0.172 0.228 0.405 -0.007
(1.56) (1.42) (1.56) (1.57) (1.42)
Population squared -0.00008 -0.00006 -0.00008 -0.00009 -0.00007
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Per-capita income - 2.55 - - 2.42
(2.07) (2.20)
Educational attainment - - 110 - 171
(718) (719)
Urbanization - - - -153 -123
(186) (183)
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes
State effects yes yes yes yes yes
F -Statistic 1st stage 10.28 10.51 11.91 8.39 9.78
Sample includes gubernatorial elections from 1946 to 1976 (410 observations). Standard errors (robust to heteroscedas-
ticity and serial correlation) in parentheses. Educational attainment and urbanization measured in percent. ‘Signature
requirement relative’ is an indicator for states with a signature requirement defined as a percentage of either the number
of votes or the number of registered voters in the preceding election. ‘Signature requirement absolute’ is an indicator for
states with an absolute definition of the signature requirement. Instrument for number of candidates is Black × V RA.
Significance levels: ??? 1%; ?? 5%; ? 10%.
of electoral competition along with the gubernatorial vote cast of the preceding elec-
tion, split into two separate effects depending on whether the petition requirement is
defined relative or absolute, the indicator for states with a relative definition, state
population and state population squared. The estimated coefficient of the total num-
ber of candidates points to a strong impact of electoral competition on the stringency
of petition requirements. Our estimates suggest that an additional candidate in gu-
bernatorial elections triggers an increase in the number of required signatures by more
than 9,300. The F -statistic measuring the predictive power of the excluded instrument
in the first-stage regression attains a value of 10.3, somewhat above the rule-of-thumb
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threshold value of 10 suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) to avoid the problem of
weak instruments.15 Recall that we use an instrument with is characterized by very
limited variation: Black × V RA switches only once from zero to one for a subset of
states and is constant and equal to zero for all others. Given that our identification
strategy is extremely parsimonious in terms of the variation that is added to the system
by the inclusion of the instrument, the performance of Black × V RA in the first-stage
regression is remarkable. Note also that using the interaction term as the instrumental
variable ensures that the difference-in-difference estimations discussed before are very
similar to the actual first-stage regressions of our 2SLS approach.
The results also show that some variation in the signature requirement is explained by
participation. As expected, however, participation is systematically related to the num-
ber of petitions only in states with a relative definition of ballot access requirements.
On average, an increase in participation by 1,000 additional votes (holding population
fixed) increases the petition requirement by about 14 signatures in the respective states.
Furthermore, we also find that states with a relative definition of ballot access require-
ments are characterized by significantly higher barriers to the entry of minor-party and
independent candidates. Evaluated at the sample mean of Vote cast t−1, these states
require about 34,700 signatures more than states with an absolute definition. This
regularity is confirmed throughout our analysis and stems from the fact that most
states with an absolute definition demand around 500 to 10,000 signatures, whereas
even moderately populous states with a rule requiring one or two percent of the vote
cast in the preceding election tend to have significantly stricter effective requirements.
Columns (2) to (4) each add one of the additional control variables, without substan-
tially affecting the results. The estimated coefficients of the number of candidates
range from 8,800 to 9,800 and are all significant at the 5% level. The coefficients of
the remaining control variables are also robust to the changes in specification. Fi-
nally, Column (5) reports an estimation that includes all our control variables. The
results almost duplicate the outcome from Column (1). Taken together, the inclusion
of additional controls does not seem to have any significant effect on our main result.
15Note that with a single instrument our model is exactly identified and we therefore cannot run
formal weak identification tests according to Stock and Yogo (2005).
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4.5.3 Robustness: Instrumental variable estimation
As discussed above, the instrument used to identify the effect of electoral competition
is extremely parsimonious as it captures only variation in electoral competition which
comes from the effect of the VRA on states with a strong black minority. There
are three southern states, however, which did abolish poll taxes as one important
restriction to black voter participation already before 1965/66: South Carolina (1951),
Tennessee (1951), and Arkansas (1964).16 We therefore suspect that the design of
our instrument, Black × V RA, is suboptimal in terms of its predictive power in the
first-stage regression. To exploit the variation induced by the abolishment of poll
taxes prior to 1966, we construct a second IV from the interaction of an indicator for
the existence of poll taxes, Polltax, with an indicator for South Carolina, Tennessee,
and Arkansas, Early Abolish. By construction, our second IV accounts only for the
variation in electoral competition that enters through the deviation of South Carolina,
Tennessee, and Arkansas from the remaining southern states in terms of the timing of
the abolishment of voting restrictions.
Table 4.5 reports the results of a series of 2SLS estimations using both Black × V RA
and Polltax × Early Abolish as IVs. A quick inspection of the results reveals that the
estimates for the effect of electoral competition on the stringency of the states’ ballot
access laws are now slightly higher, ranging from about 9,000 to 10,100. At the same
time, the point estimates are more precise: across all five specifications, the effect is
estimated to be different from zero at the 3% level of significance. Note also that
the findings regarding the control variables are virtually identical to those in Table
4.4. With two IVs for one endogenous explanatory variable, we can now also test the
overidentifying restriction. The Table reports p-values for the Hansen test, indicating
for all specifications that the overidentifying restriction is not rejected at any reasonable
level.
To describe the degree of electoral competition, we have so far used the total number of
candidates appearing on the ballot. As discussed above, one might argue that the total
number of candidates is not a suitable measure for electoral competition in a regression
with the stringency of ballot access requirements for minor-party and independent
candidates as the dependent variable. Therefore, we repeat all estimations from Table
16Literacy tests were not abolished prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1965, i.e. all states with this
kind of barrier to black voter participation were forced to remove the restriction immediately after
the CRA. See also Ogden (1958) and Husted and Kenny (1997).
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Table 4.5: Effect of electoral competition on stringency of signature requirements,
instrumental variable estimations, refined instruments
Dep. variable: Signature requirement for minor-party and independent cand.’s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total number of cand’s 9567 ?? 9044 ?? 9671 ?? 10090 ?? 9660 ??
(4125) (3872) (4143) (4575) (4293)
Vote castt−1× signature 14.0 ??? 13.5 ??? 14.1 ??? 14.6 ??? 14.2 ???
requirement relative (5.21) (4.85) (5.31) (5.44) (5.17)
Vote castt−1× signature -0.560 -0.276 -0.574 -0.308 -0.102
requirement absolute (6.10) (5.94) (6.12) (6.16) (6.01)
Signature requirement 22080 ?? 22129 ?? 22100 ?? 22175 ?? 22236 ??
relative (9091) (9022) (9101) (9175) (9094)
Population 0.237 -0.166 0.239 0.424 0.011
(1.55) (1.42) (1.55) (1.56) (1.41)
Population squared -0.00008 -0.00006 -0.00008 -0.0001 -0.00007
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Per-capita income - 2.58 - - 2.44
(2.11) (2.25)
Educational attainment - - 104 - 170
(734) (736)
Urbanization - - - -161 -132
(188) (184)
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes
State effects yes yes yes yes yes
F -Statistic 1st stage 6.51 6.41 6.80 5.32 5.22
Hansen test (p-value) 0.82 0.78 0.82 0.80 0.76
Sample includes gubernatorial elections from 1946 to 1976 (410 observations). Standard errors (robust to heteroscedas-
ticity and serial correlation) in parentheses. Educational attainment and urbanization measured in percent. ‘Signature
requirement relative’ is an indicator for states with a signature requirement defined as a percentage of either the number
of votes or the number of registered voters in the preceding election. ‘Signature requirement absolute’ is an indicator for
states with an absolute definition of the signature requirement. Instruments for number of candidates are Black×V RA
and Polltax×Early Abolish. See text for details. Significance levels: ??? 1%; ?? 5%; ? 10%.
4.5 using an alternative measure of electoral competition which excludes all major
party candidates. As Table 4.6 indicates, our results are highly robust to this change
in the definition of electoral competition. An additional candidate is found to trigger
a tightening of the petition requirement by 9,600 to 10,800 signatures. As before, the
coefficient of interest remains significant at the 5% level across all estimations.
So far our identification relies on a single explanatory variable in order to account for
the direct effect of participation on the stringency of signature requirements in states
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Table 4.6: Effect of electoral competition on stringency of signature requirements,
instrumental variable estimations, minor party & independent candidates
Dep. variable: Signature requirement for minor-party and independent cand.’s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# of minor-party & 10229 ?? 9641 ?? 10501 ?? 10801 ?? 10475 ??
independent cand’s (4650) (4254) (4821) (5161) (4891)
Vote castt−1×signature 14.9 ?? 14.3 ?? 15.2 ?? 15.5 ?? 15.2 ??
requirement relative (6.16) (5.68) (6.44) (6.41) (6.20)
Vote castt−1×signature -0.980 -0.661 -1.01 -0.795 -0.548
requirement absolute (6.79) (6.55) (6.84) (6.90) (6.69)
Signature requirement 21105 ?? 21214 ?? 21135 ?? 21137 ?? 21274 ??
relative (10024) (9880) (10007) (10155) (9973)
Population 0.061 -0.383 0.060 0.228 -0.225
(1.67) (1.51) (1.65) (1.67) (1.50)
Population squared -0.00008 -0.00005 -0.00008 -0.00009 -0.00007
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Per-capita income - 2.92 - - 2.81
(2.28) (2.44)
Educational attainment - - 286 - 347
(735) (726)
Urbanization - - - -151 -129
(198) (194)
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes
State effects yes yes yes yes yes
F -Statistic 1st stage 5.66 5.68 5.61 4.63 4.34
Hansen test (p-value) 0.97 0.92 0.96 0.95 0.91
Sample includes gubernatorial elections from 1946 to 1976 (410 observations). Standard errors (robust to heteroscedas-
ticity and serial correlation) in parentheses. Educational attainment and urbanization measured in percent. ‘Signature
requirement relative’ is an indicator for states with a signature requirement defined as a percentage of either the number
of votes or the number of registered voters in the preceding election. ‘Signature requirement absolute’ is an indicator for
states with an absolute definition of the signature requirement. Instruments for number of candidates are Black×V RA
and Polltax×Early Abolish. See text for details. Significance levels: ?? 5%; ? 10%.
with relatively defined ballot access requirements. Of course, the respective coefficient
can only capture the average of the changes in the dependent variable that are directly
related to changes in participation. One might be worried that this way of controlling
for the impact of relative definitions of signature requirements does not account for
differences in actual regulations within the group of states with such relative rules. To
the extent that part of the effective variation in B comes from imperfectly controlled
changes in participation, one might still question the validity of the exclusion restriction
with respect to our instruments. To cope with this problem, we construct an alternative
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measure of the petition requirement for states with a relative definition that eliminates
all variation that might be driven by participation. This is done by computing the
effective number of petitions demanded when a state with a relative definition changes
its percent-requirement and keeping this number in all following election years until the
state actually changes the underlying rule. Thereafter, the new level is kept until the
law is changed again, and so on. With the resulting adjusted series for the signature
requirement, participation should lose its explanatory power even for the states where
ballot access is defined in relative terms.
As Table 4.7 reports, the estimations based on the adjusted signature requirements do
not alter our results in any significant way. However, the coefficient of interest is now
estimated to be somewhat smaller. This might indicate that the previous approach
slightly overstated the effect of electoral competition on the stringency of petition
requirements. Yet, even with the adjusted signature series, an additional candidate is
still estimated to trigger an increase in the barrier of about 7,600 to 9,000 petitions.
Our conclusion regarding the strategic behavior of state policymakers when designing
of the underlying state rules is thus confirmed. At the same time, the significance
of the effect of interest remains at the 5% level for three out of four specifications.
Furthermore, the vote cast in the preceding election is no longer significant. This is
in line with our expectations, as the adjustment of the signature series ensures that
the variation comes only from real changes in the underlying state regulations and is,
therefore, not related to participation.
So far we have built on the implicit assumption that state policymakers have rational
expectations and re-design ballot access requirements in anticipation of the level of
electoral competition in the next election. Consequently, our empirical model has
related the stringency of a state’s petition requirements in any given election year to
the current degree of electoral competition, i.e. the current number of candidates. One
might question our results based on the argument that policymakers need a certain
time to learn about changes in electoral competition, or that further legal restrictions
prevent the state government from instantaneously adjusting the underlying state laws.
To test the relevance of this objection, we repeated our IV estimations based on a model
where electoral competition in period t refers to petition requirements in t+1. Thus, the
current number of signatures required to gain ballot access is explained by the degree of
electoral competition in the next preceding gubernatorial election. The corresponding
estimation results showed a drastic drop of the F -statistic across all specifications
hinting to a weak instrument problem. As a consequence, the point estimates were
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Table 4.7: Effect of electoral competition on stringency of signature requirements,
instrumental variable estimations, adjusted dependent variable
Dependent variable: Adjusted signature requirements in gubernatorial elections
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total # of candidates 7629 ?? 8184 ?? - -
(3853) (3924)
# of minor-party & - - 8365 ? 9037 ??
independent cand’s (4465) (4517)
Vote castt−1× signature 5.85 6.15 6.72 7.12
requirement relative (4.61) (4.78) (5.54) (5.68)
Vote castt−1× signature -2.78 -3.08 -3.18 -3.54
requirement absolute (5.02) (5.19) (5.44) (5.78)
Signature requirement 21774 ??? 21759 ??? 21004 ??? 20924 ??
relative (8039 ) (8035) (8642 ) (8783)
Population 0.961 0.993 0.777 0.797
(1.28) (1.28) (1.32) (1.33)
Population squared -0.00014 -0.00014 -0.00013 -0.00014
(0.00009) (0.00009) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Per-capita income 2.32 2.36 2.63 2.69
1.93 (2.01) 2.09 (2.20)
Educational attainment 374 372 515 525
625 652 (624) (647)
Urbanization -116 -132 -117 -134
181 188 192 (199)
Year effects yes yes yes yes
State effects yes yes yes yes
Black × V RA yes yes yes yesIV’s:
Polltax × Early Abolish no yes no yes
F -Statistic 1st stage 9.78 5.22 7.97 4.34
Hansen test (p-value) - 0.53 - 0.68
Sample includes gubernatorial elections from 1946 to 1976 (410 observations). Standard errors (robust to heteroscedas-
ticity and serial correlation) in parentheses. Educational attainment and urbanization measured in percent. ‘Signature
requirement relative’ is an indicator for states with a signature requirement defined as a percentage of either the number
of votes or the number of registered voters in the preceding election. ‘Signature requirement absolute’ is an indicator
for states with an absolute definition of the signature requirement. Regarding IVs, see text for details. Significance
levels: ?? 5%; ? 10%.
no more stable across the different specifications. Hence, our assumption of rational
expectations as used throughout our analysis seems to be well-justified. This finding
is highly plausible given the long period of time between two elections, generally four
years. Moreover, if ballot access laws are a suitable instrument for state policy-makers
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with the intention to deter potential opponents, these restrictions need to be adjusted
quickly in response to changing degrees of electoral competition.
4.5.4 Robustness: Difference-in-difference estimation
So far we have treated observations from 1966 as belonging to the post-shock period.
One could argue, however, that with the VRA signed into law in August 1965, it
is unlikely that its effect on the number of candidates in gubernatorial elections was
already fully present at the time when the next regular elections took place in Novem-
ber 1966. While the impact of the federal legislation on black voter participation
can be thought of being immediately effective, additional third-party and independent
candidates might have appeared on the ballot with a certain time lag. To check the
appropriateness of the definition of our instrument, we check the assignment from 1966.
Columns (1) of Table 4.8 reports estimation results with 1966 defined as a pre-shock
period and Column (2) the result when omitting 1966 altogether. In both cases we use
the total number of candidates as a measure of electoral competition. The treatment
effect is now estimated to be somewhat smaller. The picture that emerges from these
estimations is again similar to that obtained when 1966 is defined as belonging to the
post-shock-period, but both the point estimate and the level of significance are some-
what lower. The results suggest that the level of electoral competition increased quite
rapidly after the implementation of the VRA in 1965. Hence, the definition which
we have employed throughout our analysis is not only suggested by the timing of the
events, but also empirically well justified.
The remaining columns of Table 4.5 provide a final robustness check. Bertrand, Duflo,
and Mullainathan (2004) have recently pointed to the fact that the dependent variables
in many studies relying on difference-in-difference estimations to identify treatment
effects are strongly serially correlated, and that the potential bias resulting from this
correlation has often been ignored. These authors recommend among others a simple
procedure to test for the impact of serial correlation by ignoring time series information.
Therefore, one needs to average the data before and after the shock and estimate the
underlying difference-in-difference equation using the averaged outcome variable in a
panel of length two. This procedure requires a clear-cut definition of ”before” and
”after” as well as a considerable sample size. In our case, with the VRA affecting all
states at the same time and a sample comprising 42 states, both conditions are fulfilled.
Column (3) and (4) reports the outcome of the two step procedure for both measures
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Table 4.8: Effect of VRA on electoral competition, further robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
# cand’s, # cand’s, Avrg.# cand’s, Avrg.# cand’s,
Dependent variable all parties all parties all parties minor parties
Black×VRA 0.436 ? 0.506 ? 0.662 ??? 0.590 ??
(0.258) (0.261) (0.234) (0.222)
VRA - - 0.302 ?? 0.300 ??
(0.123) (0.116)
Assignment of 1966 pre-shock omitted post-shock post-shock
Nob 429 399 84 84
R2 0.56 0.55 0.87 0.88
Sample includes gubernatorial elections from 1946 to 1976. Estimations (1) and (2) a full series of year effects and a
full series of state effects. Standard errors (robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation) in parenthesis. Sample
in (3) and (4) entails the average numbers of candidates before and after 1965 (see text for details).
?? 5% significance level.
??? Idem., 1%.
of electoral competition. The results almost duplicate the results from the baseline
model and confirm the choice of our instrument.
Although the VRA is widely regarded as the single most important event that altered
the political landscape of the US South (Trebbi, Aghion, and Alesina, 2007; Besley,
Persson, and Sturm, 2006), the political science literature also discusses the relevance
of other incidents. Timpone (1995), for example, provides evidence that the aggregate
level of black registration in the US South already began to rise in 1962 due to the
start of the Voter Education Project. Accordingly, one might argue that our instrument
Black × V RA is misspecified since it captures the differential development in electoral
competition of the two groups of states before and after 1965. To account for this
objection, we repeated all estimations treating years until 1961 as pre-shock periods
and years starting from 1962 as post-shock periods. Our 2SLS estimates proved to
be highly robust to this alternative specification. Interestingly, in all difference-in-
difference estimations with year-specific interactions the effects of 1962 and 1964 were
insignificant, suggesting that the Voter Education Project from 1962 did not have a
strong effect on electoral competition.
To summarize, our results reveal that an important institution governing the degree
of electoral competition and minority representation in the US, namely petition re-
quirements for third-party and independent candidates, is endogenously determined.
In fact, the evidence reported here suggests that state policy makers have been actively
engaged in re-designing ballot access regulations. The impact of electoral competition
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on the design of ballot access rules is strong, and the direction is as expected: the more
minor-party and independent candidates appear on the ballot, the more restrictive
are, on average, the requirements to get ballot access. Based on the evidence reported
here, it appears that the major parties have consistently used their power to frame
political institutions in a way that protects their position as incumbents in a setting of
duopolistic political competition.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper starts from the question to what extent political institutions can be regarded
as exogenous constraints on political agents. To shed light on this issue, we have
examined the design of state ballot access laws in the US from the post-war period
to the mid-seventies. Our results suggest that state policymakers have systematically
reacted to increased electoral competition by raising the petition requirements that
have to be met in order to get access to the ballot in gubernatorial elections. Our
findings thus relate to the evidence reported by Trebbi, Aghion, and Alesina (2007) on
the re-design of electoral rules in cities in the US South in reaction to the increased
political participation of blacks in the aftermath of the federal Voting Rights Act.
Our identification strategy rests on the idea that the Voting Rights Act has induced
variation in electoral competition which is exogenous to the states’ ballot access regu-
lations. As a first step of our empirical approach, we have shown that the abolishment
of limitations to black voter participation such as poll taxes and literacy tests has in-
deed significantly raised the number of candidates in gubernatorial elections. We have
then provided evidence on the link between electoral competition and the stringency
of ballot access restrictions. To overcome the endogeneity problem, we have used in-
strumental variables which capture the exogenous variation in electoral competition
induced by the Voting Rights Act. Across various specifications, the increase in peti-
tion requirements triggered by an increase in electoral competition by one additional
gubernatorial candidate is estimated to be in the order of 7,600 to 10,800 signatures.
Our results suggest that the endogenous adjustment of state laws governing the access
of third-party and independent candidates to general elections has a depressing effect
on actual levels of electoral competition. This may have far-reaching consequences, as
electoral competition seems to positively affect the quality of governance and economic
performance. Besley, Persson, and Sturm (2006), for instance, claim that the increase
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in political competition induced by the Voting Rights Act raised long-run per capita
income considerably. Together with their findings, our results suggest that the effort
of state policymakers to dampen the increase in electoral competition by re-designing
the political institutions under their control may have significant welfare costs.
However, a caveat is warranted regarding this interpretation. Lizzeri and Persico
(2005), for instance, point to potential drawbacks of electoral competition, arguing
that competition induces parties to focus on the interests of a narrower constituency.
This in turn may lead to a stronger influence of special interests in politics imply-
ing substantial efficiency losses. Under this view the observed adjustment of petition
requirements could also be viewed as a socially optimal response to a rising level of
electoral competition. In our perspective, however, this rationale for limiting the num-
ber of active political parties is unlikely to be valid in the context of the US, where the
majoritarian voting system already ensures the existence of two dominating political
parties. Overall, it is hard to believe that the design of ballot access laws in US states is
socially optimal, in particular with regard to the southern states and their pronounced
tradition of political marginalization of large groups of voters.
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